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In both parts of the paper it is argued that Austin has 
by grouping together words in some important way dissimilar made 
possible criticisms which further distinctions would allow him to 
deal with. The division of illocutionary verbs into those relying on 
essentially linguistic conventions and those not essentially linguistic 
is an attempt to remove certain obvious difficulties in the locutionary/ 
illocutionary distinction. Grice’s theory of intention-recognition is 
used to consolidate the locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary distinc­
tion. But Austin’s attempts to justify his distinction between 
locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary were only a part of his philo­
sophy of language. In "A Plea for excuses** his analysis of certain 
adjectives seems to rely on certain principles of linguistic propriety 
which remain implicit. As in his analysis of illocutionary force, he is 
concerned here with the many ways actions can fail to be carried off.
Thus, in the second part, i try to show what are the principles that 
are implicit and claim that some but not all of the linguistic facts 
Austin started from might be better explained by principles different from 
the ones he had in mind. Nevertheless it does seem that the behaviour 
of some of the adjectives Austin discusses cannot be explained in the 
way his critics would like. I conclude that no one theory will explain 
the different adjectives Austin listed.
- 3 -
Djg/TAI LED s Y N u m S
oection I. The way in which Austin's distinction between demonstrative and
descriptive conventions made in "Truth" is connected with the 
later distinctions he makes in "How to do things with words".
2. How conventions operate in separating illocutionary from locutionary
and perlocutionary force,
3* A distinction is dra^ m^ between essentially linguistic and inessen-
tially linguistic conventions to mark off more clearly illocutionary 
force as dependent on inessentially linguistic conventions.
4. Another criterion by which to delimit the class of illocutionary
verbs is introduced by using Grice's analysis of intention-recognition 
Illocutionaries are then seen to be the class of verbs for which 
intention-recognition is necessary.
5. Certain difficulties which an attempt to mark off illocutionary 
force faces are considered and an attempt to deal with them is 
made.
6. It is argued that the distinctions made so far may not exactly
match those made by Austin but that this in itself may not be 
excessively damaging since Austin was not entirely happy with the 
way his own distinctions were drawn.
7. The relationship between semantic meaning and both illocutionary
and perlocutionary force is discussed.
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8. It is suggested that an analysis of "he promised" rather than 
"I promised" will be more likely to lead to a set of linguistic 
rules constitutive of the speech-act of promising; although it 
is doubted whether such an undertaking is feasible.
9. The rules governing "what he said constituted a promise (he promised)" 
are compared with those governing "he has checkmated" in order to 
show how in both cases the institution allows for (or disallows)
a given occurrence of the linguistic form.
10. The scope of linguistic rules is discussed. It is doubted whether 
they alone can account for illocutionary force.
11. It is not quite clear how that which i do when i say (e.g.) "I warn"
is to be accounted for. An explanation in terms of legitimate 
expectations is advanced.
12. ubjactions to the claim that intention-recognition is a necessary 
feature of an analysis of illocutionary force are met by distin­
guishing between "A warned B", "A was warned by what happened": 
only the former is an occurrence of illocutionary force.
13. A distinction between "warning** and "uttering a warning" is argued
for in the hope of finding another way of separating l/iiiocutionary 
force from E/illocutionary and perlocutionary force.
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14. it is claimed that the adjectives grouped together by Austin in
**A Plea for Excuses" as falling under his principle "No modification 
without aberration*' are too diverse to warrant uniform treatment.
15# The problem is further complicated by the fact that what may be
described as done "intentionally** under one action-description
\ " 
may be described as done not intentionally under another action-
description.
16. Part of the difficulty with voluntary resides in the fact that 
two different distinctions can be drawn:
(i) between voluntary and non-voluntary
(ii) between voluntary^ and involuntary.
17* The suggestion that "voluntary " is restricted to untoward actions 
in the same way as "snub" is to noses is considered and found 
insufficiently explanatory.
18. An attempt to uncover what seems to be the linguistic principle 
underlying the Austin/Cave11 position is made. This position is 
shown to be ambiguous, allowing a strong and a weak interpretation.
19. xn an attempt to find just what is meant by the claim that a 
certain utterance is "inappropriate" diverse examples of linguistic 
inappropriateness are considered.
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20. TVo linguistic principles are mentioned which might help to 
explain some of the "inappropriate" examples.
21. it is claimed that the principles might explain Austin’s 
arguments concerning the correct applications of certain 
utterances if the weak interpretation is accepted.
22. A distinction between aberrant actions and when an action goes
wrong : is made : it is asserted that Austin was interested in
the latter not the former.
23. A similarity between Austin's views and Hart's analysis of 
defeasible concepts is noted.
24. The attack on Austin/Cave11 made by bearle is examined and 
found wanting. It is claimed that one of the points it makes 
cannot even be substantiated against certain philosophical 
arguments which Searle claims (erroneously) to be similar to 
Austin's.
25* Neither of the linguistic principles manage to distinguish
two types of inappropriateness : an argument against Austin/
Gavel1 would have to distinguish between the two types.
26. it is further argued that Searle has too quickly accused Austin
of using an erroneous method of linguistic analysis. Searle's 
claim that the key-role in linguistic analysis falls to the speech-
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-act must remain of indeterminate value until we know just what 
are the criteria for distinguishing speech-acts (and why certain 
words can appear in certain speech-acts but not in others).
27. It is further argued against Searle that he cannot use against 
Austin the same argument he has elsewhere used about the meaning 
of "good".
28. It is concluded that no one single principle will be able to account 
for the behaviour of the different adjectives grouped by Austin 
under his "No modification without aberration" heading©
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I. I want to begin by showing that the main objections to Austin's
/'
distinction between constatives and performatives (most of the same 
objections are also made against his later distinction between locutionary/ 
illocutionary/perlocutionary verbs) are a development of the objections 
made against a distinction drawn by Austin in his article on "Truth": 
it seems plausible to suggest that it was the view about how language 
operates that led Austin to formulate these two distinctions which are 
vulnerable in the same way: crudely that they exaggerate the possibility
of distinguishing between meaning and context.
The objection that Austin himself and his critics^ make to the 
performative/constative distinction is that every constative has a 
performative dimension (one can say: l) performatives have a dimension
of truth 2) constatives can be unhappy 3) every constative is a 
performative since when I utter the paradigm "The cat is on the mat"
I am doing something: namely, stating, making a statement; these are
2
all formulations of the same general objection.) The parallel objection 
to the view put forward in "Truth" is that you cannot distinguish between
demonstrative and descriptive conventions in a search for truth since
demonstrative conventions in language rely for their functioning at least
1 Black, Philosophy '63; Lemmon, Analysis '62 etc.
2 Strawson, Philosophical quarterly *65
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in part on their semantic meaning (in virtue of descriptive conventions).
There is in "Truth" an attack on the isolated importance of 
'truth* itself: "like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an illusory
4
ideal" •••• "There are numerous other adjectives which are in the same 
class as 'true' and 'false', which are concerned with the relations 
between the words (as uttered with reference to a historic situation)#... 
We say, for example, that a certain statement is exaggerated gr^yague 
(or__bald, a description somewhat rough or misleading .... in cases like 
these it is pointless to insist on deciding in simple terms whether the 
statement is 'true or false* ... There are various degrees and dimensions 
lof sucgegs in making statements: the statements fit the fadts more or
less loosely, in different ways on different occasions for different
intents and purposes ...... What, moreover, of the large class of cases
where a statement is not so much false (or true) as out of place, inept* 
('All the signs of bread' said when the bread is before us)?" In this 
article Austin draws a distinction which he believes will contribute 
to a solution of the problem of * truth * and thus help show us what it 
is when a statement corresponds to the facts, is accurate, is to the 
point etc., the distinction between descriptive and demonstrative 
conventions :
4 PP pp. 91-8 I
* An example of th^ ambiguity discussed in Part 2. "Not so much false" 
(false?) as "inept". Inappropriate? Misleading?
- ro-
"De^cri^tiy^ conventions correlating the words (= sentences) with 
the types of situation, thing, event etc. to he found in the world.
Demonstrative conventions correlating the words (= statements) 
with the historic situations & co. to be found in the world.
A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs 
to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions is of a type 
with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive
5
conventions."
I want to avoid entering into the multi-sided cross-fire this 
definition has aroused. Yet Austin's demonstrative/descriptive distinction 
seems unduly neglected in the foray, for even if one questions its validity, 
it makes easier to understand the later distinctions in "Howfot do things 
with words". In a footnote to "Truth" Austin, explaining his distinction, 
writes: "The trouble is that sentences contaip words or verbal devices
to serve both descriptive and demonstrative purposes often both at once...
A sentence as normally distinguished from a mere word or phrase is charac­
terised by its containing a minimum of verbal demonstrative devices (Aris­
totle's reference to time); but many demonstrative conventions are verbal 
(pointing and co.) and using these we can make a statement in a single 
word which is not a 'sentence'. Thus 'languages' like that of traffic 
signs use quite distinct media for their descriptive and demonstrative
op. cit. pp. 89-90
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elements (the sign on the post, the site of the post). And however 
many verbal demonstrative devices we use as auxiliaries, there must 
always be a non-verbal ori^^n for these co-ordinates which is the point 
of utterance of the statement. Suppose we are at the zoo and see 
the sign GNU fixed onto a specific cage: demonstrative conventions
(the site of the sign etc.) tell us that the sign is a name-of-anima1- 
in-cage sign, descriptive conventions inform us about the particular 
animal to be found. In short, demonstrative conventions indicate to 
us where the gnu is, descriptives what's in the cage. The sign is 
correct when a gnu is in the cage. An interesting point is that the 
sign is wrong (what it states is false) either if (l) an okapi is in 
the cage (the descriptive conventions fail to correlate) or (2) the 
sign falls to the ground (here the fault is with the demonstrative 
conventions). This example is comforting for Austin's theory since:
(1) it shows how the different conventions function and how to­
gether they can yield truth
(2) it shows how given any two out of demonstrative conventions, 
descriptive conventions and truth you can pick out the third (e.g. if 
you know the sign is right and ivhat the demonstrative conventions are, 
then, by inspecting the cage you know that what you come face to face 
with is a gnu.)
6 op. cit. pp. 89-90
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To the exanqple (optimum for the theory) important objections 
can be made. It will be asked: how do I know if not by descriptive
conventions that the sign GNU is a name-of-anima1-in-cage sign, since 
if I see NO LITTEa on the cage I don't search around for a clean-shaven 
government official behind the bars (one could speculate about the 
possible confusion EGhJESS may cause to the uninitiated, or a man who 
wants to cross the cage marked PANDA), it will be objected in the same 
way that I must know what CUL Dù SAG means before 1 can see how the 
demonstrative correlations are to work, whether or not these objections 
can be dealt with, Austin's distinction is even less tenable when we 
try to apply it to a language like English (as opposed to traffic signs 
etc.) for those words which establish demonstrative correlations (e.g.
"now", "there" which replace the site of the sign etc.) do so in virtue 
of their meaning (descriptive correlation).
it seems to me that if one wants to defend a position more fav­
ourable to Austin than claiming a total collapse of the distinction^,
S(me use may be made of the fact that reference may be made to the Chilean 
crossing the road by "The Italian over there!" A distinction might then 
be drawn between intrinsically semantic conventions and non-intrinsically 
semantic conventions like the occasion idien a word is uttered, for instance. 
( The intrinsically semantic conventions will correspond to the descriptive 
conventions of the "gnu" example; the non-intrinsically semantic (e.g. the
As has been done by Strawson in ihil. Quart. '6^
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context of an utterance) to the demonstrative.)
That such a distinction exists in language can be seen from the 
fact that the sergeant-major's command "Jackson, Clark, Smith!" is ful­
filled by the three men falling into line in the order their names are 
yeèled out. The order their names are yelled out is tied by non-intrin-
g
sically semantic conventions to the order they are to stand on parade.
whatever the ultimate fate of the demonstrative/descriptive con­
vention distinction, I hope to have shown that it is not unrelated to 
Austin's later locutionary/illocutionary force distinction. My point 
was that locutionary force inherits the semantic (sense and reference) 
qualities of descriptive conventions: whereas with illocutionary force
there is the stress on context, on time of utterance etc." .... for some 
years we have been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of 
an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some 
extent to be'explained* by the'context' in which they are designed to 
be or have been spoken in a linguistic interchange, let we pre still 
perhaps too prone to give these explanations in terms of 'the meaning 
of words'. Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference to 
illocutionary force — 'He meant it as an order*• But 1 want to distin^ 
guish force and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to 
sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense
8 Picture theory of language? It may well be that such an example brings 
out to best advantage what is being claimed by the defenders of a picture 
theory of language.
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9and reference within meaning". And of course the same moves as before 
are open to critics since in both cases there is the assumption that one 
can clearly distinguish in analysis between meaning and context (force). 
Austin himself remarks that there do not seem to be occurrences of locu­
tionary acts which are not also illocutionary acts (the problem with 
"I state"); it has even been doubted whether any value whatsoever can 
be given to the notion of illocutionary force.
2. But, of course, the notion of illocutionary force does not
stand exactly to locutionary force as demonstrative conventions to des­
criptive since whereas in the latter distinction the two components are 
of equal complexity, in the former, illocutionan^ force comes into play 
at a more sophisticated level of linguistic analysis.* what allows 
illocutionary force to come into its own are conventions, but Austin 
could have said more about the role they play in its determination. In 
"Performative Utterances’*^  ^he wTites "First of all, it is obvious that 
the conventional procedure which by our utterances we are purporting to 
use must actually exist. In the examples given here this procedure will 
be a verbal one, a verbal procedure for marrying or giving or whatever 
it may be; but it should be borne in mind that there are many non-verbal
9 'How to do things with words" p.100
10 Jonathan uohen rhil. Quart. '63 11 Reprinted in rPP pp. 220-239
* That is over and above considerations of the meanings of words. Crudely 
illocutionary is concerned with not only the semantics but also the pragmatics 
of language. (The point is discussed below.)
(>
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procedures by which we can perform exactly the same acts as we perform 
by these verbal means .... The first rule is, Then, that the convention 
invoked must exist and be accepted. And the second rule, also a very 
obvious one, is that the circumstances in which we purport to invoke 
this procedure must be appropriate for its invocation." In' Sow to do 
things with words", Austin is even less explicit in claiming that the 
performance of an illocutionary act "may be said to be conventional in 
the sense that at least it ^ould be made explicit by the performative 
formula.
Now if the latter remark is taken to have no connection with the
former (if one does not believe that there is an intimate connection
between there existing a convention in the world and there being a
performative formula in language) then Austin may well be open to Strawson's 
13criticism that there are occasions when "the illocutionary act itself 
is not £S£enti^al^ly a conventional act, an act done as conforming to a* 
convention, it may be that the act is conventional, done as conforming to 
a convention, only in so far as the means used to perform it are con­
ventional. To speak only of those conventional means which are also 
l^ in^ guiSit^ c means, the extent to which the act is one done as conforming 
to conventions may depend solely on the extent to which conventional 
linguistic meaning exhausts illocutionary force." But it seems likely 
that Austin must have held views as to why it was that to perform only
12 HDW p.103
13 Phil. Review '64
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certain human activities there existed first person verbal forms which 
had special characteristics; his remark about illocutionaries being 
conventional "in the sense that it could be made explicit by the perfor­
mative formula" can then be seen as standing for a more general theory 
about the relation between certain linguistic acts and conventions.
In my attempt to refute Strawson's criticisms I will take a 
circuitous route. I will argue (a) that a distinction between two 
types of conventions can be made;(b) that if one claims that Austin 
can only mean conventional in the sense that "it is a conventional 
matter what words stand for what objects", one is unable to distin­
guish between certain illocutionaries and certain other verbs; (c) that 
to make the distinction a stronger sense of conventional is required;
(d) that anyway Strawson's examples are not damaging to Austin's 
distinction since a strong definition of illocutionary force can exclude 
that category of verbs which Strawson's verb "object" belongs to.
I begin by distinguishing two types of conventions which I will 
call (l) essentially linguistic conventions (2) inessentially linguistic 
conventions. Two possible confusions must be explained: l) I am using 
"convention" in a strong sense so as not to allow that it is a matter 
of convention that a given word in Jiinglish has a given meaning: if this
were to be allowed, as when a weaker sense of "convention" is used, all 
linguistic acts would depend upon conventions and the points Austin put 
forward could never be made. Of course it has to be argued that illocution-
- 17 -
-ary acts are conventional in the strong sense. 2) In my examples 
of illocutionary acts I will sometimes use (as Austin did) what were 
under the performative/constative distinction called implicit performatives 
as opposed to explicit performatives. It does seem to me that Austin 
underestimated the complications the inclusion of implicit performatives 
would bring to his theory: these complications stem in the main from 
the fact that (a) I can make a promise without uttering the canonical 
formula "I hereby promise you ..." (b) I can utter the formula and not 
make a promise.
3. I will take inessentially linguistic conventions (l/ con­
ventions for short) to be conventions in the world, (conventions of 
etiquette, ceremonies etc.); essentially linguistic conventions (E/ con­
ventions for short) to be conventions about language. I will distinguish 
l/conventions and E/conventions as follows, if an action is performed 
under an l/convention it does not follow that anything was said ( although 
this may be the case) and so under l/conventions (i) he X'd he said
something. If an action is performed under an E/convention, it follows 
that something was said and that which was done was done in saying some­
thing. So under E/conventions (i) he X'd —  ^he said something, 
l/illocutionaries are verbs whose illocutionary force depends on l/convention# 
E/illocutionaries are verbs whose illocutionary force depends on E/conven­
tions. (It may be objected here that it cannot be any stronger sense of
14 for the same underestimation see Searle "What is a Speech Act?"in 
'Philosophy in America' ed. Max Black.
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"convention" that E-conventions than that which makes all verbs con­
ventional. But if we take an exairple of implicit E/illocutionary force, 
say, "Our production is diminishing" used as a contradiction, it is clear 
that it cannot have the force of a contradiction solely in virtue of the 
meaning of words ("conventional" in weak sense), since "Our production 
is diminishing" can be uttered on occasions when it does not count as# 
a contradiciton. And now it may well be a question of terminology whether 
one accepts that E/illocutionaries are conventional in a strong sense 
as long as one recognizes that they are not solely conventional in 
virtue of semantic meaning: (see below).’
However useful it may prove to mark off the locutionary/illocution­
ary distinction, the distinction between l/conventions and E/conventions 
will not by itself support the full weight of the illocutionary/perlocu­
tionary distinction because (a) the remark "lour mother comes from New 
Orleans " which relies for its effect on l/conventions has the perlocu­
tionary force of insulting, whereas (b) "The red flag is up" said as 
a warning also relies on l/conventions for its illocutionary force.
4. In order to explain the illocutionary/perlocutionary
15distinction, 1 will use the requirement developed by Grice , that the
person addressed realize that the speaker wanted his intention (the speakei^'
to be recognized. This is Grice's (i^) intention that A, the hearer,
15 "Meaning" Philosophical Review '57
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shall recognize S's (the speaker's) intention (i^) that S intends to 
produce a certain response (r) in A by uttering X, (For a much more 
complete account of this intention-escalation see Grice-Strawson optit.) 
And it is the case that for (a) to be successful as an insult it is not 
necessary that the person insulted recognize the speaker's intention for 
it to be so taken; whereas in the case of (b) the person addressed must 
see why the person speaking to him has said "The red flag is up" for 
the utterance to have the force of warning.
So it seems that intention recognition which is essential for 
illocutionary force (l must see the purpose of the red flag you wave 
in front of me) is not necessary for perlocutionary force: I get
excited about, am insulted by something ypu say Tvithout needing to see 
that what you said was to be taken as an insult or a stimulant. It 
even seems intuitively probable that intention recognition may impede 
perlocutionary force: I may not be annoyed by a remark if I see that
that is its aim;* the awaited insult may well be stingless, np-one 
was impressed by the Bourgeois Gentilhomme.^^ it is true that the differ­
ence here is not enormous, for we do have a verb similar to 'insult*, 
namely*provoke*. In hidebound duelling ciid.es it is probably still the 
case that a glove thrown at a man's feet acts as a p^r^yocatj^on , The 
gesture is equivalent to his saying "I hereby provoke you" etc., and
* It is of course true that I may be all the more annoyed by a remark if I 
realize that its aim is to annoy me. Although this seems to less likely 
than being less annoyed, it does not affect my argument which is that 
intention recognition is not essential for perlocutionary force.
16 Strawson op. cit.
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of course intention-recognition is essential, (See, for imbance, "The 
Marx Brothers go West", where much humour derives from challenges not 
being recognised). Whatever truth there is in Austin’s remark about 
the German students who formally insulted each other^^, it would still 
be peculiar if every time the formula was used the person addressed 
foamed at the mouth (and indeed, there does seem something odd about 
perlocutionary force being habitually employed: as people do not normally
laugh at the same joke, so to upset, humiliate, alarm, arouse, exéite, 
one must vary one's methods of (verbal) approach). it is also true that 
intention-recognition is not necessary for E/illocutionary force, in 
a conversation A says "It will be an hour’s drive to London tomorrow"©
B says "The roads are flooded/ A continues to talk about his trip to 
London. Later on C describing the converstion says "B’s saying ’The 
roads are flooded' contradicted A, although the latter did not realize 
it (at the time).
So far the following has been claimed:
(i) i/conventions may contribute to an utterance having either 
illocutionary or perlocutionary force.
(ii) for illocutionary force, intention-recognition is required 
in addition to l/conventions.
(iii) intention-recognition is not uecessaty for perlocutionary 
force, even sometimes inhibiting
(iv) I/conventions are not necessary for a remark to have perlocu­
tionary force.
17 HDW p.30
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(v) intention-recognition is not necessary for a remark to have 
E/i1locutionary force.
5* I want to argue further that:
(vi) although it seems t at either l/conventions of E/conventions 
are necessary to illocutionary force,
(vii) that those examples of illocutionaru force to which
E/conventions are necessary form a specific category which a strong
definition of illocutionary force can rule out and thus ccxnbining (vi)
and (vii) I will claim that: .
and not E/conventions
(viii) l/conventionsj|^«e are necessary to illocutionary force. 
Certain conventional behaviour can be linguistic or non-linguistic.
(a) when 1 sto^ at red lights my behaviour is in accordance with 
non-linguistic conventions
(b) a policeman who wants to stopa car can either blow his whistle
or s-hout ’Halt!’: in doing either of these things he acts in accordance
with an l/convention. But
(c) for what A did to count as a contradiction, a disagreement, a 
rejoinder, a report of B ’s utterance (he contradicted etc.), appeals 
must be made to conventions tjat are essentially linguistic; the act
- 2 2 -
which is described must be carried out by language.* And of course there 
is no alternative non-linguistic way in which these acts can be carried 
out. However it is the case that there are relations utterances can 
have between them without there being a non-linguistic alternative which 
are not examples of E/illocutionary force (e.g. rhyming with, appearing 
five pages later, rendering inaudible). So an utterance B can do X to 
an utterance A id.thout having the illocutionary force of X-ing : my
remark can close the conversation (as when I say "that will be all") 
without having the illocutionary force of closing a conversation.
Before trying to deal with this problem I want, hopefully, to 
claim that whilst heeding to be met, it does show a^eakness in Strawson’s 
attack on Austin, for it does seem that Strawson’s position does not 
distinguish between "close the conversation" and "contradict": Strawson
says "In the course of a philosophical discussion (or,for that matter, 
a debate on policy) one speaker raj^ sjes an pbjLGctdon to idiat the previous 
speaker has just said. X says or proposes that p and Y objects that q.
* it may be objected that if I claim (as I want to) that a nod etc. which 
counts as agreement is part of a language (e.g. English), then why not 
also include the whistle of the policeman, the glove thrown doivn as a 
challenge. So it may be that the argument must be amended to claim that 
since to say that X is a contradiction of ï is to postulate a relation 
between two events, it is necessary that, at least. Y was said (if Y 
is an objection and X a counter-objection to ¥, then at least W must 
be said etc.)
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But where is the convention that constitutes it an objection? That 
Y*s utterance has the force of an objection may lie partly in the charac­
ter of the dispute and of X ’s contention (or proposal) and it certainly 
lies partly in ï’s view of these things, in the bearing which he takes 
the proposition that q to have on the doctrine or proposal that p. But 
although there may be, there does not have to be convention invoibved 
other than those linguistic conventions which,help to fix the meanings 
of the utterances". If this were the case one would have to treat in 
this way a situation in \diich Y*s utterance "closed the conversation", 
and one certainly wouldn't want to say that this is an example of illo­
cutionary force. The difficulty of Strawson's position is that it can­
not explain the difference between "close the conversation" and "contradict".* 
Furthermore, the difference between them cannot be one of intention-recog­
nition, for Y ’s utterance counts as an objection whether or not X takes 
it as such (cf the delight tutors get out of forcing a student to a 
recognition of a faulty argument out of which he (the student) had been 
hoping to make much capital.) Importantly, that "contradiction" etc. do 
not need intention-recognition is an indication of their peculiarity as
* Wliich a theory which seeks to explain illocutionary force must do. So 
it seems that if one argues as Strawson does that some illocutionaries are 
conventional only in the sense in which linguistic meanings are conventional, 
one will not be able to explain why it is that "being an objection" is an 
example of illocutionary force whereas "closes the conversation"is not* His 
attempt to explain "having the force of an objection" in terms of the way Y 
views the situation cannot be right since another person could describe the 
situation "Y thought what he said constituted an objection, but it didn’t 
really". ("Being an objection" is a formal quality.)
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as examples of illocutionary force.
Now a promising move to help distinguish between "close the coh -  
versation"/"contradict" is to insist that for A to be an occasion of 
illocutionary force the utterance (a) must stand in relation X to 
utterance (b) in virtue of semantic meaning. This requirement will not 
quite do since it may be in virtue of semantic meaning that the English 
sentence "The cat is white" is the translation of the French sentence 
"Le chat est blanc" , without "is the translation of" being an example 
of illocutionary force. So it .seems that the claim that E/illocutionary 
force depends on a relation between utterances must be improved upon: 
perhaps something like "utterance (a) has the illocutionary force of X 
if its truth-value stands in a relation B to the truth-value of utterance
(b) (which precedes it)" will do. The model for this is that -P is a 
negation of P irrespective of vdiat is inserted for P (in a way irres­
pective of the meanings of words). Of course when we have a situation 
where (a) is a negation (generic term) of (b), we will sometimes way
(a) is a denial of (b), sometimes an objection to (b), sometimes contra­
dicts (b) etc.; likewise vhen (a) and (b) have the same truth-values 
we will sometimes say (a) affirms (b), agrees with (b) etc.: which one
we use in a given situation will depend on i/ and E/conventions. The 
following example may help: if after a tumultuous 4.30 at Kenq)ton Park, 
the jockey of the horse that £a£S£d_the_Un£ second says (in a specific 
place) to the stewards "Piggot beat me by foul means", he has made an 
pbJ[ejcti^ on, which would not be the case if he said the same thing to his
-  2^5 -
wife at home. His objedtion may be overruled or sustained. Alrthough 
the E/conventions which make a given remark an objection to another may 
not be as rigid as the l/conventions which make the jockey’s remark (Jis 
move need not be a verbal one, it may be sufficient to raise a hand) 
at Kempton Park an objection. And of course there is not always for 
every E/convention a corresponding l/convention: there is no extra-
linguistic occurrence of a contradiction.
6. It may be thought that to have any value the distinction between
E/i110cutionaries and l/illocutionaries will have to reflect Austin’s 
locutioÿary/illocutionary distinction but the trouble with this demand is 
that ^a) the new classification would suffer from the same defects as 
the old: though its only justification is my separating off the troubling
expositives*to reinforce the old distinctions.
* Austin in his classification of illocutionaries says this about 
expositives (p.l60): "Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving 
the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of 
usages and of references, we have said repeatedly that we may dispute as 
to whether these are not vendicative, exercitive, behabitive or commissive 
acts as well .... Eor good value, i shall give you some lists to indicate 
the extent of the field. Most central are such examples as "state", 
"affirm", "deny", "emphasize"; "illustrate", "amswer". An enormous number 
such as "question", "ask", "deny" seem naturally to refer to conversational 
interchange: but this is no longer necessarily so, and all, of course,
have reference to the communicational situation", (my italics)
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(b) 1 am not at all sure how the distinction bet ween E/convention 
illocutionaries (nearly all Austin’s expositives ) and l/conventionr 
illocutionaries does reflect Austin’s locutionary/illocutionary distinction^ 
this is in part because of the baffling way in which Austin himself makes 
the distinction: "To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say 
also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, as I propose to call 
it. To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine 
in what way we are using the locution: 
asking or answering a question
giving some information or an assurance or a warning 
There is nothing mysterious about our eo ipso here. The trouble 
rather is the number of different senses of so vague an expression as 
"in what way we are using it - this may re^er even to a locutionary
w
act ... Once again we seem to reach a situation where the distinction 
breaks down (" surely to state is every bit as much to perform an illocu­
tionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce"). Austin does try to deal 
with this difficulty by claiming that "we could distinguish the perfor­
mative opening part (i state that) which makes clear how the utterance 
is to be taken; that it is a statement ^as distinct from a prediction) 
from the bit in the that—clause which is required to be true or false.
The difficulty with this argument is that "I say that ", "I state that",
"I utter X as a contradiction" etc. are often left out (in a court of
law what a man says becomes his-^tat^m^dhwithout his having to begin 
with "I state"). So if "I state that X" has illocutionary force, so
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does "X" and the locutionary distinction collapses (see Austin’s footnote 
of despair about his attempts to mark off the locutionary/illocutionary/
perlocutionary distinction "(l) All this is not clear (2) and in all
18
senses relevant# (won’t all utterances be performative?" )
?• In order to make workable the locutionary/illocutionary
distinction, I want to try to sharpen the E/convention/l/convention
oSvo
illocutionary distinction: this will help to separate l/illocutionary
force and perlocutionary force. We have seen that intention-recognition 
is a necessary feature of l/illocutionaries: I want to reinforce the
claim made earlier that this is not so of E/illocutionaries. Let us take
(i) he contradicted her although she didn’t realize it
(ii) he warned her although she didn’t realize it
(iii) he persuaded her although she didn’t realize it.
It does seem reasonable to suggest that (ii) alone seems odd (why this
is so I will begin to explain later), for I can be persuaded and contra-
point
dieted unawares. Another interesting/seems to follow: from the fact that 
there are many things 1 could say during the minute of silence for General 
X at the Albert Hall which would count as an insult (to his memory and 
his widow) it might be thought that perlocutionary force is unaffected 
by the meaning of words. Now this cannot be true since although there 
is a prima facie assumption that anything said is an insult (since a 
minute of silence has been asked for), if I said truthfully "There is a
18 HDW pp 103
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fire in the balcony!", I can hardly be accused of insulting. None the
less A~4istin (or anyone else) has not suggested a way of distinguishing
between perlodutionaiy force and the causal properties of an utterance.
if,following Austin,we allow that a remark can have the perlocutionary
force of annoying, does a remark that makes me jump have the perlocutionary
force of startling? Does a pop-song (because of its rhythm) have the
perlocutionary force of making me dance? In order to answer in the negative
( as presumably Austin would want to) it will have to be argued that
it
if an utterance is to have perlocutionary force at all it must have/in 
virtue of its semantic meaning but this seems difficult to reconcile with 
the fact that almost anything i say during the minute of silence will 
count as an insult.
That a remark has l/illocutionary force (e.g. is a warning) depends 
in some way on the meanings of words. (l will later discuss a possible 
counter-example, after having distinguished between "what he did warned 
me" and Jfwliat he said warned me"). Searle^^ has constructed a situation 
which he considers damaging to Grice’s analysis of non-natural meaning. 
"Suppose that I am an American soldier in the second world war and that 
I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get 
these troops to believe that I am a German in order to get them to release 
me ...I, as it were, attempt to put on a show of telling them that I 
am a German officer by reciting those few bits of German that I know......
19 Phil, in America op.cit.
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Therefore I, a captured American, address my Italian captors with the
following sentence: "Kennst du das land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?" Let
us deacribe the situation in Gricean terms. 1 intend to produce a certain
effect in them, namely, the effect of believing that I am a German officer,
and I intend to produce this effect by means of their recognition of my
intention. 1 intend that they should think that what I am trying to tell
them is that 1 am a German officer. But does it follow from this account
that when 1 say "Kennst du das Land ..." what I mean is ’I am a German
officer*? Not only does it not follow, hut in this case it seems plainly
false that when 1 utter the German sentence what I mean is ’I am a
German officer*, or even *Ich bin ein deutscher offizier*, because what
the words mean is "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?"
Of coutse, 1 want my captors to be deceived into thinking that what 1
mean is *I am a German officer*, but part of what is involved in the
deception is getting them to think that that is what the words which I
20
utter mean in German" . But it seems to me that this criticism of Grice
is wrong, if revealing: wrong because Grice does not want to limit non-
natural meaning to semantic meaning. Searle begins that part of his paper
21
entitled ’Meaning* by asking the questions "But what is it for one to 
mean something by what one says, and what is it for something to have a 
meaning?" But these are two very different questions, though Searle in 
his criticism of Grice tends to forget this fact. It is true that Grice
20 Searle op.cit. p.230
21 Searle op.cit. p.228
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22
does write If we can elucidate the meaning of:
" X  meant NN something (on a particular occasion}" and 
*X meant that so—and—so (on a particular occasion)" 
and of
"A meant ^  something by X (on a particular occasion}" and 
"A meantj^ by X that so-and-so (on a particular occasion}", 
this might reasonably be expected to help us with
means (timeless )^ something (that so-and-so)
(timeless^) by X something (that so-and-so)" 
but nowhere in the paper does he argue for why answering the one might 
reasonably be expected to help us in answering the other. And clearly 
from ixrice's own examples of non-natural meaning we can see why it may 
not help.
(1) "I draw a picture of Mr ï behaving in this manner and show it 
to Mr X. I want to assert that the picture (or my drawing and showingit) 
meant^N something (that Mr Y had been unduly wmf ami liar), or at least 
that 1 had meant^^ by it that Mr Y had been unduly unfamiliar.
(2} 1 have an avaricious man in my room, and I want him to go ....
i point to the door or give hima little push, then my behaviour might 
well be held to constitute a meaningful utterance, just because the recog­
nition of my intention would be intended by me to be effective in speeding 
his departure.
22 Grice op. cit. p. 381 
+ my italics
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Now these non-linguistic examples whow that (a) at best cases of
linguistic meaning must be a sub—class of cases of non—natural mean ing
(b) ^hejanalysis cannot distinguish between my asserting Mr Ï was unduly 
and my pretendin^i to assert that Mr Y was unduly familiar,
f ami 1 iar,/be tie en meaning that the man should leave, and pretending t 
to mean that the man should leave
o« in Searle'8 example the man would be doing what he is described
as doing either if he were a German officer of if kwere pretending to
be a German officer. But a similar dual description is not correct
in cases of linguistic meaning: one cannot claim that Ulivier in
"Othello" is pretending to spÿ *I am jealous', he saying 'I am jealous*
23
although he is only pretending to be jealous . (c) One could go
through exactly the same routine on a different occasion and it would
mean^ something different.
This last point is well-demonstrated by a linguistic example of 
2hnon-natural meaning ♦ Suppose as a remark on a pupil 's philosophy 
collections, 1 say 'Jones has beautiful handwriting*, I imply that his 
philosophy is rather poor. The implication is easily 'cancellable* if 
I add 'and he it a good philosopher* (there may be no pejorative implication 
if I am talking about say, Plato.) It does seem correct
23 in the case of the thief Window-cleaner Austin discusses in 
'Pretending*, it seems right to ar^ue that he is cleaning the window but 
pretending to be a window-cleaner.
24 Taken from Grice's 'Causal Theory of Perception'« His remarks on 
implication are more fully discussed in the second part (pp 64)
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that my remark meantj^ j^ that he was a bad philosopher (on this occasion), 
but clearly "he has beautiful handwriting " cannot meaii^j^timeless)
"he is a bad philosopher *' if "mean^^ (timeless)" is claimed to be at 
all similar to "means in ringlish". (if it isn't, then "meaning^" will 
not be much help in explaining linguistic meanihg).
if this is so, the criticism is revealing in showing us just 
why the Gricean analysis is so useful in explaining illocutionary force; 
just because it operates at a level different from linguistic meaning. 
Suppose I am mountain-climbing in a foreign country: I hear in a certain
tone a shout; seconds later the avalanche just misses me. I take the 
shout to have meant "Watch out!" (l don't hqve to know the German for 
"Thin Ice" to he warned by the acrobatic show-off who has just fallen 
in and out of kindness bids me not to follow suit). So we want to say 
that what illocutionary force, if any, a remark has, depends on what 
meaning the words arje _fcaken _to_ have* by the person spoken to and not 
what meaning the words actually have.
(iii) With E/illocutionaries it is certainly not the case that 
their force depends on what meaning the words are taken to have; a 
denial of what you say is a denial no matter how you take it (this goes 
hand in hand vdth the fact that no intention-recognition is necessary). 
However, presumably everything 1 say is a statement of mine (or at |bast
* Difficulties about this formulation are discussed below.
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a saying) no matter what ; but clearly not everything I say is a contra­
diction etc. So we want to say with qualifications that E/illocutionary 
force does depend on the meaning of words or, more precisely in the 
relation between meanings of words in different sentences.
To complete the distinction between E/illocutionaries and 
l/illocutionaries I will argue that with the latter a distinction can 
always be drawn between e.g. 'he uttered a warning' and 'he warned', 
whereas with the former no such distinction can he made (to utter a 
contradiction of his utterance is to contradict him); it is also true 
that this will help to distinguish perlocutionary force from illocutionary 
since you do not utter an exhortation or an arousal - you exhort, you 
arouse I As an l/il locutionary 1 shall use 'warn* and 'promise' and
hope that they can stand as representative of the group, although realizing
that analysis of individual verbs would be preferable.
8. It does seem fair to suggest that writers on illocutionary
force have been slightly unclear as to whether they were analysing the
the
rules for/speech-act of promising occurring or the /tules for 'I promise 
being used. What should be given are the semantical rules for *X promised' 
('X will only have promised if), since when we say the semantical rules
25 This is connected with the point made above that there can hardly 
be formulae for perlocutionary force.
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for the speech—act of promising, we could mean rules for :
(1) 'he^romised*
(2) use of the utterance 'I promise*
(3) the institution of making a promise being evoked
(1) and (3) become identical (are the same) though there could be a 
society where promises were made and the expression 'he made a promise* 
not used, but, hopefplly, this is not our situation. What we want are 
semantic rules for the correct application of * he made a promise'. But 
of course part of the difficulty with such an enterprise will be the 
attempt to convert into semantic rules a group of conditions required 
for the performance of an l/illocutionary act (in this case a promise).
The problem can be seen when an l/illocutionary * I promise to 
brush my teeth* misfires (say because it was never in question that 
what was promised would not be done as a matter of course). If one 
tries to find rules for the use of a function-indicating device for
26
e.g. promising , one faces the difficulty already mentioned that given 
the cannonical formula 'I hereby promise you',
(a ) I can promise without using the cannonical formula (either 
by a handshake, by saying 'count on me! ' or by saying *1*11 be right 
overmen the telephone.)
(B) 1 can use the formula without promising (as in the case of
26 as does Searle op.cit.
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promising to brush my teeth, or promising you something you don't want).
9® It may be helpful at this point to compare the distinction
between (a) the conditions required for a promise to be possible and
(b) the rules governing the uses of 'what X  said constituted a pro&ise* 
with (a^ )^ the rules of chess, and (b^) the rules of the expression 
'he was checkmated', it is clear that in a society which didn't know 
what chess was, the expression 'he was checkmated* would have a use, if 
use it had, totally different from that which it has in ours. So we 
can say that the game, as it were, gives the expression ‘he was checkmated* 
sense, in the same way the conditions constitutive of the institution of 
promising give *what X said constituted a promise (X promised)* sense.
It cannot be the case that 'he was checkmated* just describes 
the position of the pieces because its correct application requires
(a) that it was not open to the person so described to make an effective 
move, after ^vhich his king would not be taken
(b) that * check!* had been said by his opponent.
However the game, as it were, cannot guard against misinvocations. For 
*he was checkmated* to be used correctly; (l) a game must have been 
played and ended (2) it cannot be used correctly if there has been an 
infraction of the rules of the game - a difficult problem arises when 
the person cheated fails to notice his opponent's duplicity - (3) the 
only temporal requirement of 'he was checkmated* is that it be said
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after the game , which is not the case for 'check!*, which has very strict 
temporal requirements regulating its correct use. It does seem tempting 
to push the analogy by indicating the similarity between ' check* and 
* I promise*:
(1) both can be used correctly if certain conditions hold - inijthe one 
case that the pieces are in a certain position, in the other that the 
promiser can fulfil his promise, that he intends that which he promises.
(2) both can be mis invoked (of course there does not seem much point
in trying to deceive someone into believing that he is in check (and aiQr- 
way it cannonly be done against a beginner) but presumably there w u l d  
be situations where it could be very much to the advantage of a player 
to convince his opponent that he must move his king.
(3) both can only be correctly used whilst a game is in process
(4) It is almost the case that like * I promise*, 'Check!' is a perfor­
mative utterance, uf course you don't put a man in check by saying 'CHeck!*
27
(you do that by moving your knight), you do however £onfi^rm that your 
opponent is in check by saying 'Check!'; and of course a man c^ annjot be 
checkmated unless you have said 'Check!'; you do not win the game,if, 
as it were, you surreptitiously and without saying ' check! * block your 
opponent's king (cf the great disputes at the turn of the century between 
grand masters as to whether 'Check!* to the Queen ('Dame!') had to be
27 This may help to explain why it has been mistaltenly thought that 
'I know* is a performative.
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announced: it i s still done out of courtesy in middle-Ujiiropean cafe-chess
• 1 \28 circles )
A final similarity in the analogy is that whilst '1 promise',
' check! ' are limited in their applicatuoni (they must be within the space­
time of the game), 'he was checkmated*, ‘he promised' are not so limited* 
The analogy fails on two important points: (1) whereas a game must be 
in process for 'Check!* to have application, T  promise*, as it were, 
creates its own game*, it announces that a game is on* This is largely 
because of the important role 'i promise* (and to a lesser extent its 
implicit forms : * count on me* etc/ plays in the promising-game; its role 
is important enough for it to guarantee that all the other necessary 
requirements for the game are présent (this is why deceivers can operate:
their intentions are presupposed by their using *I promise*). There is
29
for instance something misleading about Austih*s statement. "Wliere, 
as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain 
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential 
conduct on the part of a participant, then a person participating in and 
so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings 
and the participants must intend so to conduct themselbes.... If we sin 
against any one or more of these six rules, our performative utterance
28 Max Black in Phil. *63 remarks that when a move is announced in 
blindfold chess, words are used to do other than make an assertion. With 
* '  in blindfold chess you ^  something.
29 W  p. 15
* token not type use.
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will be unhappy*: for it seems more correct to say that in these cases
the infelicity results from the presence of a contrary thought or 
intention and not from the lack of some required thought or feeling.
It is not necessary to have a certain intentioh, because of part of using 
*I promise* is to express (conventioimlly) and intention, and a man can 
invoke a convention of which he is unaware. Anyway, Austin has complicated 
the issue by lumping together (under * infelicities *) very different ways 
in which a performative can go wong*. It might be thought that i cuuldn*t 
perform an illocutionary act unintentionally: but this does not seem
to be the case. Something I say may well be a promise (count as a promise), 
a warning (count as a warning) without this being my intention. The 
conditions which must apply for * check!* (or *he was checkmated ) to be 
applicable are, more or less, on a par with each other: they consist
in the main in a list of moves etc. But the conditions for ’he promised* 
to be applicable are much more varied, they consist in the situation of 
the two people involved, their desires, capabilities and so on and one of 
these, that * I promise* or an implicit equivalent was uttered, is mukh 
more important than the others.
10. A problem which 1 find difficult to deal with is the Austin/Searle
requirement that we concentrate on the speech—act in (*r analysis ("we
must consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued - the
total speech-act etc.) Since speech-aéts do not occur in a void,
30 HDW p. 52 -
* His discussion on how performative utterances can, as all actions,go wrong
is closely linked to similar points in *A Plea for Excuses*,discussed in Pt2 
of tkis
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since they operate in the world and establish relations between individuals, 
it seems that it will be difficult to analyse how they operate in exclusive­
ly ^e^nt^c (linguistic) rules. The following quote from Searle^^ expresses 
the view that it will be possible to do this: "To put this point more
precisely, the production of the sentence-token under certain conditions 
is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit 
of linguistic communicdion ... To perform illocutionary acts is to 
engage in a rule-governed form of behaviour ... I intend therefore to 
explicate the notion of an illocutionary act by stating a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of 
illocutionary act, and extracting from it a set of semantical rules for 
the use of the expression (or syntactic device) which marks the utterance 
as an illocutionary act of that kind". Suppose we accept that the illo­
cutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication (which may 
well be a citcular way of putting things): it then follows that his
constitutive rules of language are constitutive rules of linguistic 
communication. It may be objected that his conditions for the performance 
of a particular kind of illocutionari) act cannot lead to semantic rules, 
since illocutionan/ acts are not locutionamj acts . (Suppose I am a 
potentate of an Eastern kingdom; just as I am about to have my brother’s 
head chopped off he falls at my feet and garbles God knows what; his 
utterance (\vhatever he says) is, 1 suppose, an illocutionary act of 
beseeching and his communication linguistic. And it has the meaningj^^$force^
31 Fhil. in America op.cit. p.222
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it has not solely in virtue of semantic meanings. This again brings 
up the difficulties ivith non—natural meaning discussed above (e.g. iiy 
brother might be pretending).
Now bearle would object and argue that it is just because of 
examples like this that he has ewebded Grice’s analysis ("We must there­
fore reformulate the Gricean account of meaning in such a way as to make 
it clear that one's meaning something when one says something is moi’e 
than just contingently related to what the sentence means in the language 
one is speaking! in our analysis of illocutionaiy acts, we must capture 
both the intentional and the conventional aspects and e^ecially the 
relationship between them, in theprformance of an illocutionary act 
the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the 
hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect, and furthermore, 
if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved 
in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters 
associate the expressions with the production of that effect", bo the 
emendation will enable jis to differentiate non-natural meaning (red flagsjetc) 
from non—natural linguistic meaning, since Searle claims that only in the 
second case does the hearer recognize the speaker's interntion to produce 
the desired illocutionary effect in virtue of the fact that the lexical 
and syntactical character of what he utters conventionally associates it 
with producing that effect; however, two things must be remembered:
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(1) a theory of illocutionary acts cannot only deal with explicit 
performatives of the form *î promise you*, *I warn you*. |bearle in 
analysing I promise*, and not * What X, said counted as a promise**
(X promised*) has done just this#^  It must also take into consideration 
implicit performatives.
(2) Austin certainly intended his theory of illocutionari^ force to
cover non-linguistic cases (the umpire pointing to the pavilion, indicating 
that the batsman is out etc.)
(3) Illocutionary acts have non-linguistic equivalents (the handshake 
for the promise, the flag for ’warning* etc.), so it seems odd to want
to explain illocutionary force in terms of semantic and syntactic notions. 
The following example may help:in a given context (because of reasons 
like notoriety of the chef etc.) the utterance ’The cake came from Luigi's* 
will count as a warning, but it seems misleading to say that this is so 
because of the meaning of words. My point is that language cannot be 
analysed outside the contexts in \diich it is used; in what roles it is 
used to regulate human behaviour. Wliilst we could set up semantic/syntactic 
rules to define the speech-act of asserting, that which the speech-act of 
warning does over and above asserting cannot be so analysed. Language 
varies between people, linguistic usage varies as do the people who use it. 
This is all the more so when we use language to engage in institutional
* not *what he said was counted as a promise * which seems similar to 
'what he said was talc en as a promise*, which is not what one is looking for.
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activities like marrying, promising, lending etc. whose existence rests 
on extra-linguistic conventions which vary (e.g. it is said of Pritchard 
that he never used »I promise', only 'I fully intend').
II* if 'The cake came from Luigi's' is not a warning solely
because of the meaning of words, then why is it? Given that to warn 
is to do something more than to say, it is not exactly clear how Austin's 
description of an illocutionaru act 'he Y'ed in saying X* is to be taken. 
This would allow for the following cases:- 
"^^ (a) Ying is a kind of saying
(b)Y'ing is not a kind of saying
(b^j Y'ing is not a kind of saying but necessarily includes saying
(bg) Y'ing is not a kind of saying and does not necessarily include
saying (not even the possibility of being translated into saying),
(a) cannot be right since it requires that Y 'ing (warning) were just a 
certain species of discourse (an E/illocutionary like asserting), that 
is if warning were a species of saying just as waltzing is a species of 
dancing, (b^) would be correct if the act in question were the sort of 
thing vhich could be done without saying anything (as for perlocutionaries 
'surprising' , 'exciting'). But in warning some sort of communication 
between the parties is involved (of coutse , not necessarily linguistic, 
but necessarily conventional). If it is argued that for the intention- 
recognition procedure to be possible the conventiohal behaviour used could
32 Schema adapted from a seminar of Max Black's.
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be transposed into a linguistic framework (in what way does the use of 
non—linguistic conventions depend on there existing a language proper?), 
then we are left with (b^ ^^ ) but of course more work must be done on 
‘saying*, 'doing* etc. before we know just what is the force of the 
conclusion reached.
Whether the statement 'The cake came from Luigi's' is taken as
a warning depends not on whether I say it with the intention that it
be so taken but rather whether the person to whom it was addressed
realizes that I had such an intention. In other words, what counts is
33how it affects his legitimate expectations. Of course, as Geach points 
out in 'Mental Acts' one cannot argue that the meaning of 'it is raining' 
depends on the reaction of the hearer, for it may make him put on or 
take off his rain-coat depending on what he wants out o^ life. Still 
we are dealing here with i.ll.o^ ujbijoi^ r5i_ force, we are dealing with 
institutions, the point of which is to affect human behaviour ('I will 
go to the theatre since he promised to meet me there'); I want to say 
that the criterion for the existence of a promise or a warning is that 
the hearer's expectations are affected: now this clearly won't do, for 
not just any affecting of the hearer's expectations will count, we will 
also have to deal with the very difficult cases d^iere the expectations 
are not affected and yet we want to say that a promise, a warning has 
been made (see below). The point is that if under certain conditions 
A says to B *1 promise that X', then the expectations B forms about A's 
33 Van Loon Mind ' 55
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behaviour are legitimate ( he has a right to form them); t h ^ _  w i U _  
whatever A*s intentions are ( in a similar way one can say 
that A's ignorance of the rule that traffic coming from the right at 
a roundabout has right of way does not in the least affect the legitimacy 
of B* s expectation that A would give him his due priority ( it does 
however cause the ensuing accident!)
34
Strawson's analysis of 'understanding' brings out this point 
*1 suggest, then, that for A to understand ^omethj^n^ by utterance X, 
it is necessary, and perhaps sufficient that there should be some 
complex (ig) form , described above, whicMtakes^ S to__hav^ * , and 
that for A to understand the utterance correctly, it is necessary that 
A should take S to have the complex intention ofthe (i^) form which S 
does have. In other words, if A is to understand the utterance correctly, 
b (ij^ ) intention and hence his (i^) intention must be fulfilled. Qf 
course it does not follow from the fulfilment of these intentions that 
his (i^) indention is fulfilled; nor consequently that his (i^) intention 
is fulfilled". So in order for A to understand that S is promising X, 
nothing follows logically about S's real intentions (this must he so for 
these to be insincere promises etc.). it can be noted that as long as 
the person addressed understands English some form or uptake (the recog­
nition of (i_) (i.) intentions)should not fail to occur when i use the 
canonical formula 'I warn you that ....etc.' (this may well be because
34 PH *64 pp448
35 op. cit. pp 447
* my italics
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the paradigm way of saying I have such an intention is just to appeal 
to the linguistic convention/, but clearly things get much more 
complicated when implicit forms are used.
12. Now an objection to the claim that for speech—act & to
be a warning the listener must mmlize the 'warning-intention* of the 
speaker could take the form of the three follo^fing examples: (l) Lor renne
Gordon in a recent Analysis argues ' If I am driving with you down 
the A 40 and scream bn seeing a car approaching fast from a side-road, 
thereby warning you of impending disaster, I have warned you though my 
scream was certainly (though not, of course, necessarily) intentional*.
This is a thoroughly misguided argument, for it assumes that what l did 
was to 'warn*, that my scream was 'a warning'. I am warned by the clouds 
that it will rain, but the clouds don't warn me intentionally or 
unintentionally. Although a distinction must be drawn between 'warning' 
and 'taken as a warning* we cannot insist on intentionality for illocu­
tionary acts if the distinctions we have to make to do so become purely 
ad hoc, but this need not be the case. It seems likely that a careful 
analysis of 'warning* would reveal that all cases one wants to describe 
as examples of 'A warned B' are cases where B supposes A's utterance to 
be intentional; admittedly the supposition may be misguided (A may be 
reciting a play etc.), but in these cases the situation is totally different
36 April 196b
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from Miss Gordon's Tvhere A's exclamation is involuntary (or at least 
outside A's control.^
(2) A is sitting opposite B. B sees U enter the room. She knows C 
has come to kill A; with the money they (B and C) will steal, the first 
down—payment on their illicit honeymoon is to be made. Inadvertently, 
she gasps 'C!'. because of her gasp, A turns round and avoids being 
murdered. Later on, he explainsto the police 'I was warned (of U's 
presence) by her gasp.* (i) Did B warn A? (ii) Was B*s gasp a warning? 
Here we have a situation where recognition of intention is not necessary 
for A to__b^ warned. What has to be shown is that in this example A is 
warned by what B says but that this is not a case of B warning A; as
I am warned by clouds of rain, so I can be warned of a burglar by his 
grunts as he stumbles over the safe. I can be similarly warned by 
linguistic means (a burglar's curses) but in none of these cases does 
any^tiÀg warn me.
(3) Let us suppose that in a ccmimunity the impending arrival of a
notorious assassin is recognized by a red handkerchief being tied to the
victim's door. A knowx the murderer has designs on his friend B; in
order to warn B he ties a red kerchief on B*s door: B finds the kerchief
and flees. Later on he finds out what had happened. It must, I think, 
that
be admitted/in retrospect (safe by the fire etc) he can say 'I was warned 
by B* or 'B warned me', but it is also true that he could not say this
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at the time of warning (assuming he thought as the community did that
it was the murderer himself who placed the kerchief on his door). So
what I want to claim is that for a description of the form 'A warned B'
to be appropriate, correct intention-recognition must take place at the 
time of warning.
We can be misled by the similarity between:
(i) He warned me of his presence by swearing by grunting
(ii) He warned me of the danger by saying 'Thin ice! '
But whereas (ii) is a case of telling me^^ ( he told me that the ice
was thin), (i) is not. The clouds do not tell me of rain, though people
do say of their dog 'By wagging its tail he is telling me that he is
hungry.', but there might be something excessively anthropomorphic about
such a remark. When tell occurs in 'I am told by the dog wagging its
tail that it is hungry', *I can tell by the crackling in the radio that
there will be a storm*, 'I could tell by what he said that he was angry*,
there is always an obvious causal story that can be told which is not
the case with 'telling that'. It is also true that in these cases I
cannot disbelieve what I am being'told*, whereas I can in cases of
'telling that'; it may well be objected that we can say "The dog is
telling me that he is hungry by wagging his taiL". This is true and
shows that the analysis is far from complete. A further move is to show
37 It may well be the case that 'tell* is too vague to be of much use. A 
move towards clarity is made by Macintyre in 'Journal of Philosophy'I965 in 
distinguishing between 'telling'to', 'telling how', 'telling that'. But 
such a move can only be made to sort out forms of linguistic communication 
which a grunt is not.
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that whereas in the example given above it is a physical characteristic 
(a part of the dog - his tail) which 'tells', it is not so in cases like
'he told me he wmuld go to Bristol'.
Although it may be true that what are taken to be warnings must 
on most occasions influence people's behaviour, (expectations etc.) a 
person's behaviour can fail to be influenced because
(1) he doesn't believe what the warning tells him (e.g. The bpartans are
coming' or 'Wolf! wolf!')
(2) He just fails to respond (he says 'what will be, will be' etc.)
(3) A man says to him as a warning 'The cake is from Luigi's' but he
knows that Luigi's is now under new management, that the food is OK.
(3a) A man says to him 'The milk's three weeks oldj but he knows it is 
the new long-li^e milk, what is common to all these situations is that 
the person concerned will Say in describing them ‘I was warned, but .....*
in (l) he will say 'I was warned but 1 didn't believe it'
in (2)'I was warned but I didn't care'
in (3) (3a; 'I was warned but 1 knew that the situation had changeqd'
This is not the case ivhen:
(4) he does not hear the'warning'
(5) he does not take it to be a warning ( is misled by the tone of voice et<J
(6) he doesn't understand what he is told (because it is in a foreign 
language)
(7) he doesn't realize the significance of what he is told (someone might
not know that the food was bad at Luigi's, he may even believe it to be
reasonable).
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in these cases A (the person involved) will deny that he has 
been warned, his line of argument will be 'how was I to know what "X!” 
meant. I'm not a oerbo-uroat*. (Of course I am not here interested to 
find out just where ignorance is culpable: it may well be the case
that a CO lit will fine a man for sticking his head out of the train
window, its argument being that he ought to have read the blurb: but
of course if he didn't read it , he can't be said to have been warned.
It is the latter problem (when a man can be said to have been iirarned) 
that is in question.)
In the cases where a man says 'I was warned, but ....(l) (2) (3)
(3a)*, we see that whether or not he physically responds to the warning
will depend on his desires (e.g. he will go on eating the cake if he
wnats indigestion): there is always the possibility for him not to act
once he has been warned, but this possibility does not seem open to
him in cases of unintentional warning; wiiere the criterion of there
having been a warning is that there was a response. If in the A-40
car case my behaviour is not affected by the shout, then 1 was not warned.
This point may u’ell be valid elsewhere: although one doesn't want to
make the notion of a promise rest on the creation of expectations (if
this were so the liar could never lie), it does seem to be the case
that in marginal cases the scrupulous man i/ill judge whether he promised
or not by idieter expectaions were aroused in the person he made a promise* 
to. Clearly, if 1 am warned of tiie rattlesnake's presence by the sound
of its rattle, it does not follow that the rattlesnake warned me ( an
!* said 'I promise' or imphcit form is more correct
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interesting parallel here is that vhilst 1 cannot disbelieve what the 
sky tells me, l can disbelieve what the radio tells me. It may be 
objected here that these are different senses of 'tell',*and I am 
willing to accept this since it would follow that if we used ’the 
rattle-snake warned me’ it Avould be a different sense of ’warn*).
Ü0 I want to argue that for ’A warned B' to be a correct descrip­
tion of a situation it must have been possible for B to have fully
understood the force of what A said and yet (because of B ’s beliefs 
and/or desires) not to have acted ^ o n  it.
Let us place in diminishing order of specificity:
(1) B was warned by what happened
(2) B was warned by idiat A did
(3) B was warned by lAat A said
(4) A warned B
What makes A*s utterance a warning in the full-blown sense 
is B ’s recognition of A ’s intention to warn; if B fails to respond 
it is still not a case of A ’s trying to warn B. what I am trying to 
do here is to find what minimum conditions must exist for an illocutionary 
act to exist; for Austin, the condition was the ’securing of uptake’; 
is this fully explained by intention-recognition?
Take: (l) I tried to convince him
(2) I tried to warn him
(3) I tried to order him
* See above p. 47
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(1) means something like 1 failed to make him change his views, to
come over to my side etc.
(3) is different (rom (l). It could be used, for instance, when my 
order gets lost in the post, v.hen 1 am not heard etc.
(2) seems to fall somewhere in between (l) and (3) since like an order 
a warning can get lost ii the post (since 'a convincing', 'a persuading' 
don't exist, they cannot get lost in the post); on the other hand 'I 
tried to warn him by telling him the cake was from Luigi's but he didn't 
understand' seems to indicate the affinities (2) has with (l).
13. At this stage it seems useful to introduce a distinction
between (a) uttering a warning and (b) warning sogieone. Since I utter 
a warning ^  someone but warn someone (direct object), it seems intuitively 
right ot suggest that 1 can utter a warning and no-one hear but that 
I cannot warn someone if he doesn't hear. So it follows that there are 
occasions of 'uttering a warning' which will not be occasions of 'teaming 
someone'. am using 'uttering' in a wide sense here, like communicating).
This is correct because one will include under 'uttered a warning' cases
like (4) the warning is not heard, l5) the warning is not taken seriously
(6) the warning is given in a foreign language. \7) presents a problem 
since it cannot be said that in saying 'The cake came from Luigi's, I 
uttered a warning just because 1 wanted it to be taken as such. It 
must be known about and around that "Luigi's" is a by-word for bad cake.
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although it needn't be known by the person to whom i spoke (if one argues 
that there must be a convention which makes my remark a warning, one f 
is not committed to arguing that everyone need Ae in the know about the 
convention)•
Having found occasions of 'utter a warning' i^ or utter a promise, 
utter an order etc.) \diich are not occasions of 'warning; 'ordering' etc. 
we might try to look for occasions of 'warning' which are not occasions 
of 'uttering a warning', in an article* which argues for a similar 
distinction between 'uttering a lie' and 'lying', f. Siegler takes an 
example from Sarte's story "The Wall" where a man in an attempt to 
deceive his questioners inadvertently gives the correct answer when asked 
of the whereabouts of his friend. Now clearly, as biegler argues, since 
what he says turned out to be true, it seems bizarre to claim that he 
told a ie, but since he says what he believed to be false, we can, with 
less hesitation, say he lied. This type of move does not seem open to 
us in the case of warning since there does not seem to be such a clearcut 
distinction between what was said ^a warning) and what was done (someone 
was warned). This is, crudely, because a lie is a deliberate mistruth, 
whereas a warning is that which warns and has no such formal characteriza­
tion. but take the situation in which, during the war, someone, in 
order to warn his neighbour of a German patrol says *xt must be bad 
weather in franlcfurt today' . if he succeeds we will say he warned his 
neighbour, what he said counted as a warning etc, but not, 1 think,
•he uttered a warning*. (l am not at all sure about this point; it may 
* American Philos. Quart. I966
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gain any plausibility it has from the oddness of 'utter*. Perhaps we 
could describe this cage as 'he gave a warning' (which seems to stand 
between 'utter a warning' and 'warned'). Certainly not all cases of 
'warned' are cases of 'shout a warning' but this is because of the specific 
nature of shouts. Still the point is not vital to the argument)
The distinction between 'he mttered a warning' and 'he warned' 
is not quite the same as that between "he said 'I warn'" and 'he warned' 
(discussed above), since ' he uttered a warning' includes implicit 
performative uses. And of course that there is such a thing as 'uttering 
a warning', 'issuing an order' shows that conventionally the utterance 
of certain forms of words perform certain actions. However the fact 
that such a division can be made cannot be a sufficient condition of
l/illocutionary force since the division can be made with e.g. lying,
which is not an «ample of illocutionary force. But it may be a necesary 
condition (I think this point might show how to make invalid Strawson^s 
puzzling example of a specific utterance of the words 'don't go', which 
would be correctly described as an entreaty. One argument might be tole 
claim that the utterance has the f o m  of an entreaty but not the force 
(and of course from the fact that an utterance has the form of a prayer 
of an elegy, it does not follow that there exists illocutionary force 
of imprecation, of being an elegy (even less speech-acts)). Still I am
too confused by beseech, request, beg, pray, implore, entreat to see
exactly what is being «aid when one alone is singled out. (Are all 
entreaties requests? etc.)
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The distinction between "uttering a warning" and "warning" will 
however provide with another indicator for separating l/illocutionaries 
from fi/illocutionaries and perlocutionaries, since in the case of 
E/illocutionaries the distinction cannot be made (you cannot utter a 
denial and not deny), nor can it in the case of perlocutionaries since 
you cannot utter a convincing etc.
I have tried in this section to indicate what differences may 
under1 ^ Austin's classification of verbs into locutionary/illocutionary/ 
perlocutionary. 1 have also tried to show that certain criticisms may 
not be as damaging as they seem to be, since they are concerned with a 
group of verbs dissimilar in important respects from Austin's paradigm 
illocutionaries; it doesn't seem to matter whether we call l/illocutionaries 
illocutionaries or not as long as we remember their differences from 
E/illocutionaries.
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14. Underlying Austin's writings on language are views as to
how language works which are not always made explicit. In his discussion
about how actions can be "muffed**, Austin often makes the point that a
certain utterance is "inappropriate". In this section 1 will discuss
some of the difficulties a theory of the inappropriate in language
will have to face.
The doctrine of "no modification without aberration" is put
38
forward by Austin in "A Plea for Excuses" and defended bybCavell
39in "Must we mean what we say" .(I will take Cavell's article to be a 
defence of Austin's position even though the former sometimes takes 
a more radical view: in these cases 1 will note the differencet)
Austin and his critics have taken the doctrine to apply to the 
following adjectives amongst others :
(1) "voluntary" and "involuntary"
(2) "intentionally" and "unintentionally"
(3) "inadvertently"
but are (l) (2) (3) that much of a muchness?
38 Phil, rapers pp. 123-153 39 Inquiry 1958 pp. 172-212
* Certainly one of the differences between them is their amount of linguis­
tic tolerance. Austin is concerned with utterances in good English; an 
utterance grammatically below boctrd just 'won't do' and that's that ; Cave11 
on the other hand is prepared to try a slightly bizarre utterance, inthe I
hope that it might show something about correct utterances, about how j
language works, about different societies etc.(cf"if someone talks bosh, j
imagine a case in which it is not bosh. The moment you imagine it,yuu see •
at once it is not like that in our case". Wittgenstein'Notesjon Aesthetics'/
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Recent literature (including Austin) has tended to accept the 
fact that 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are not an exhaustive classification. 
And thus there has been an adoption of Aristotle's division of actions 
into the voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary; making distinctions* 
between my fully-fledged actions for which I am responsible ("voluntary"), 
those actions which I carry out under duress (*non-voluntary') and the 
uncontrollable spasms of my inner parts ^'voluntary'). Although there 
seems no reason to suppose that Austin might not have accepted this three­
fold classification of actions (though only of untoward occurrences); 
it has been argued that even if he had he was mistaken about the appli­
cation of "voluntary"; since the reason why we don't qualify the 
great majority of our everyday actions is not because, as he thought 
it won't do to say they are voluntary (* it is fundamental to Austin's 
account to emphasize that we cannot always say of actions that they 
were voluntary, e^en when they obviously were not involuntary either.
Although we can (sometimes) say 'The gift was made voluntarily', it is 
specifically not something we can say about ordinary, unremarkable 
cases of making gifts, only when the action of making the gift is in
some way unusual or extraordinary or untoward can the question whether
40it is voluntary intelligibly arise' ) but that they are so obviously 
voluntary(^vhat else could they be?) And this criticism seems to me 
well-founded: there seems to be no point in asserting that I brushed
my teeth this morning voluntarily, just because it is obviously true
this is no longer"'following Aristotle 
40 Cave11 op.cit.
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that I did. The tripartite division (voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary)
might affect the argument iîjone supposed that Austin meant by "voluntary",
"deliberate", in \diich case he could be taken to be saying that everyday
actions were "non-voluntary", but this interpretaion seems to me to be
highly implausible since it is clearly true that our everyday actions
are not non-voluntary.^^
(2) Under one interpretaion 'intentionally* and 'unintentionally'
are clearly not exhaustive; for if one takes 'unintentionally' to mean
'without wanting to', 'accidentally', it does not seem to be the case
that everything 1 do not do unintentionally, i do intentionally: things
i do habitually (light a cigarette», rub my eyes) or do without thinking
seem to cause a difficulty for an exhaustive dichotomy, une wants to
42agree with• Anscmmbe that perhaps it is thoroughly misleading that the 
word ' intentional' should be connected with the word 'intention', for 
an action can be intentional without having any intention in it'• But 
this doesn't help very much, especially since it might also be the case 
that not all intentional actions are done 'intentionally' which seems 
close, but not that close, to deliberately, it seems right to claim 
that not all action not done accidentally (unintentionally) is done 
deliberately ('intentionally';, in idiich case the argument against Austin
41 it is however difficult to accept both the claim that everyday actions 
remains unqualified because obviously voluntary and Miss (xordon*s^Analysis 
1966) point that some everyday actions are non-voluntary. Austin's critics 
cannot have it both ways. j
42 'intention' p. 1 /
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here is a different one: namely that the reason why "it will not do
to say either that I sit in my chair intentionally or that I did not
sit in it "intentionally" is because "unintentionaly"/"intentionally"
43are not exhaustive,
15* Thfe way of dealing with the problem, however, neglects the
complication that when I intend (it is my intention to do) an action 
under one description it is not the case that I intend it (the same 
action? event?) under another description.* For example a sailor may 
intend to tie a complicated knot but cannot be said to intend every
motion the tying of the knot requires since he may well not be able to
predict/describe them (or again, I intend to lift a suitcase but I don't 
intend to flex the muscles lifting the suitcase requires). So there do
43 see note on fo&lowing page
* This is also true of "voluntary". I may do X "voluntarily" under 
one description, but non-voluntarily under another. However this point 
brings out a possible insufficiency of the voluntary/non-voluntary/involun— ; 
tary division. For in the case when I sign a paper voluntarily but un- j
knowingly sign a contract at the same time (because the paper is a deed i
of contract); it doesn't seem correct to say 1 signed the contract non- 
voluntarily (if 'non-voluntarily' means'under duress*), nor is it right 
that I signed the contract 'voluntarily'. So we may need a further term 
to mark off actions done voluntarily but in ignorance, unlmowingly.
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seem to be cases where something I do can be intentional under one 
action-of-mine description but unintentional* under another: tlius
one wants to say that (waiving difficulties which the move 'I intend' 
to 'intentionally' may cause) intentionality of action-descriptions 
can be non-transitive. It seems to me that the sailor could be described
* Further work on the subject may make it necessary to, as with 
"voluntary", distinguish between the "non-intentional" and the 
"unintentional”. If this is the case it m ^  demand that "unintentional" 
in this occurrence be changed to 'non-intentional'. However, the 
point would stand, an action would wtill be 'intentional' under one 
description, "not intentional " under another (the 'non-intentional' 
and the "unintentional" together would make up the 'not-intentional*). 
This difficulty occurs Wien "unintentional" is used in other parts 
of the paper. Austin wites in "Three ways of Spilling Ink" (Phil. 
Review '66 p. 429): " But it's hard to see how I could have done 
such a thing unintentionally, or even (vhat_i£ not jthe^  ^ ame) not done 
it intentionally." So he must have envisaged at least a threefold 
classification: but it seems extremely implausible to suggest that
Austin, or anyone else, would want to argue that everyday actions 
were non-intentional (the middle class). Especially as this would 
be a direct contradiction of the redundancy theory about the use of 
'intentional' (note 5 p.437 of same article)
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as, in a given situation, tying the knot intentionally but doing the
specific movements unintentionally (he i^ doing them automatically ,
and in the same way, I lift my suitcase intentionally, but 1 flex my
dorseopeds unintentionally). The point can be better shmvii in an example
taken from wollheim.**
A man decides to count aloud a series of numbers beginning at
2 and adding 7 each time; his argument here is :"i could not say before-
hand, short of fitting down with paper and calculating, what number
i would come out with at, for example, the eighth place. It was indded
only when 1 heard the number quite correctly, that i eigen knew what
number I was saying. But surely there is nothing in all this that could
conceivably give us reason to say that, whereas counting in accordance
with the progression was something I did intentionally, coming out with
the number 51 was something that merely happened. On the contrary, what
seems right to say here, and anything else absurd, is that if the counting
in general was intentional, then so also must have been the coming out
* Habitually? That he ties the knot may not be somethfing decided 
automatically (he may deliberate as to whether it is worth while , seeing 
that the time for his slippers is close at hand) but once he has decided 
to tie the knot his movements are automatic; they are also habitual (as 
may be his deciding to tie the knot), they may also be mechanical (though 
the word< seems to have a pejorative aura). For a discussion of these 
concepts see A. R. White 'Attention' (Basil Blackwell 19^4, especially
pp. 123-6.
** 'On Drawing an Object' p.18. It is of course the case that 1 use 
the example to show something wollheim would disagree with, but then 
i do not think he has proved what he wants, namely the transitivity of 
intentionality.
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with this particular number," But now, let us take a mathematician 
with feet of clay. Suppose that, saying the series aloud, he comes 
out with ’53’ as his eighth term. Now the man has made a mistake, he 
has come out with the wrong number, so a1tough he said the eighth term 
intentionally, he mack a mistake, cane out with the wrong number unin­
tentionally, assume he didn't mean to do it). It is true that if
he hadn't made a mistake (there is no mistake when he says 51) it seems
bizarre (wrong?) to say that he came out with the right number uninten- 
44tionally (although we can note that to say 51 was in no way part of 
his plan, his intention was to_yoic.e_the_sjer^e^) : but if this is so,
we are now in a better position to see what night be the force of Austin's 
argument that we only use 'unintentionally' when a mistake has been 
made, when something untoward has occurred. (3) 'Inadvertently', 
'recklessly* have to be treated differently since they have no positive 
form ('reckful' etc.) "Above all it will not do to assume that the 
'positive' word must be around to wear the trousers: commonly enough
the'negative'-looking word marks the (positive) abnormality, while 
the 'positive* word, ijf it exists, merely serves to rule out the
44 rerhaps he comes out i/ith the eighth number intentionally, but says 
'51* unintentionally, ihis is clearly a wrong description of a situatioh 
although it is the case that to say the right number ^s part of his plan 
before he sets off, whereas to say '51* is not (he doesn't know what 
the eighth term is). Thus it must be that the meaning of 'intentionally' 
can only in part be explained by 'part of a plan'. 'It is my intention to' 
is much more intimately linlced with 'part of my, plan* • This is what is 
wrong with Austin's example (quoted in zidk'The Concepts of Ethics'; of 
smashing the impeding go-cart on my way to put out a fire, leather than say 
as Austin does, that i do not smash the go-cart intentionally, it seems more 
correct to say 'i smashed the go-cart intentionally but it was not part of 
my intention to do so (although I did not intend to)**
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suggestion of abnormality.* It is natural enough in view of what 
was said above, for the positive word not be found in all cases •••
By claiming that was inadvertent we place it ... in a class of 
incidental happenings which must occur in the doing of any physical 
act. 10 lift the act out of this class, we need and possess the expression 
"not inadvertently": "advertently" if used for this purpose would
suggest that, if the act was not done inadvertently, then it must have 
been done noticing what I was doing, which is far from necessarily the 
case ..o Again there is no use for "advertently" at the same level as 
"inadvertently^: in passing the butter I do not knock over the cream
jug, though I do (inadvertently) knock over the tea-cup - yet, I do 
not by-pass the cream-jug advertently, anything that we do is, if you 
like, inadvertent, though we only call it something we have done, if 
there is something untoward about it". Two arguments could be used 
against Austin here.
(l) It could rightly be claimed that, even if "advertently" 
existed, it need not follow that any action need he performed either 
advertently' or 'inadvertently'. Since it would be argued that the
* This is just \diat Austin denies about 'intentionally' in an article 
I have had little time to assimilate (misconstrue!): he writes in P.B 66
pp. 438 "What would be wholly untrue is to suggest that 'unintentionally' 
is the word that 'wears the trousers' ... in the present case there is the 
verb 'intend' to take into account, and it must have a highly 'positive' 
sense; it must just be used to rule out 'don't or didn't intend'. This 
does seem to confirm the view that the adjectives being discussed cannot 
be treated in a similar way.
- 64 -
two adjectives need not be exhaustive. 80 Austin is making the 
situation too favourable for himself again by arguing that if 
'advertently* existed it would suggest ' that there is o^me_thijig^  in 
common to the ways of doing all acts not done inadvertently', it 
needn't so suggest. However if such an argument is used (non­
exhaust ive dichotomy argument) it shows that the situation with 
'advertently - inadvertently* is not at all the same as the 'voluntarily- 
involuntarily' situation where the argument against Austin relied on 
an exhaustive dichotomy (or trichotomy): 'it is just because our 
everyday actions are in the large majority done voluntarily that we 
don't so qualify them'. It can be noted here that certainly Austin
didn't think that 'voluntarily' and 'involuntarily' formed an
45exhausti-fe dichotomy, for he wTites ' "Voluntarily" and "involuntarily", 
then, are not opposed in the obvious sort of way that thei^  are made to
J
be in philosophy or jurisprudence. The "opposite" or rather "opposites" 
of "voluntarily- " might be "under constraint" of some sort, duress of 
obligation or influence; the opposite of "involuntarily" might be 
"deliberately" or "on purpose" or the like. Such divergences in opposites 
indicate that "voluntarily" and "involuntarily", in spite of their 
apparent connexion, are fish from very different kettles.'
16. 1 think that Austin is right here and I would like to
suggest (but not defend) what I think t0 be part of the problem: there
45 op. cit. p. 139
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is a certain ambiguity in the word 'voluntarily’ which enables at 
least two distinctions to be made (a)^voluntarily - non-voluhtarily.
An action is done voluntarily if done freely, but noh-voluntarily if 
one is forced to perform it by someone else (the compulsion being in 
the nature of a threat and not, for example, oJ^nother person holding 
your hand and moving it: for in this latter situation there would not
be an action of yours ( this distinction cannot be that easily made 
since there will be cases where it is not clear wheMicr% X is an action 
of mine or something that happens to me. *I was pushed' and 'I stumbled* 
seem very close to each other. And the similarity between 'I tripped* 
and *I was tripped' shows that an active/passive verb distinction will 
not be as useful as it might intuitively seem to mark the distinction 
between actions of mine and what happens to me. There might be cases 
idiere one accepted responsibility for things that happenend to us (though 
* I did it but 1 was pushed' and 'I did it because I slipped' are more 
common) in the way one does when one is agent, it definitely is the 
case that one can be held responsible for cases of non-voluntary actions, 
for cases of culpable ignorance and cases where one 'voluntarily' fails 
to predict certain consequences of one's actionsImportantly, in both 
cases (the free and the 'under threat'), the actual performance is under 
the agent's control.
(46 Ans combe : Journal of Philosophy 19^3
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(b) Voluntarily^- involuntarily
An action is done 'voluntarily*^ if it is under the agent's control,
'involuntarily' if it is not. xhis makes a distinction between actions 
such as holding a pen and those like belching, blinking'one's eyes etc. 
Under this distinction all actions described under (l) would be voluntary^© 
But of course we still have to classify actions into those which are 
and are not under the agent's control: all those things people do
idiosyncratically, but which they can at a pinch, prevent themselves 
from doing: e.g. blinking, rubbing their forehead, certain cases of 
nervous stammering, yawnipg. It is the case that I can for a time, 
say during a guest speaker's peroration, refrain from yawning, but it 
is also true that if, as it were, a yawn gets up momentum there is 
nothing I can do to stop it (it is also true that if the peroration 
delays into the night my restraint will indubitably be vanquished).
1 am in the position of the foul-mouthed student who sooner or later 
will iiiwittAn^l^ say, as the tea-party lingers on, words not taught 
to him by his parents. And this classification is by no means 
complete since a further distinction would have to he made between 
those actions which the agent can come to control by being informed of 
their causes (certain cases of stammering , nervous tics etc.) and those 
where causal knowledge is of no use (case of stammering where there is 
a physical defect). Over the former group the agent has control in the 
sense that he can remove himself from the environment where they occur, 
over the latter he has no such control.
—  6 7 —
Are we to say that i yawned voluntarily or involuntarily? That 
we may reproach ourselves in these situations is inconclusive since, 
as remarked above, w^lame ourselves for tripping which is hardly a 
paradigmi of voluntary^ action. (I do not believe that the person 
wlio blames himself for the horrors of Nazi Germany and yet admits that 
there was nothing much he could do about it is necessarily well on the 
way to being mentally defective. This is not to deny such a thing as 
excessive remorse but only to wish for an aHlysis which does not eliminate 
it is a moral phenomenon by making it a clinical one.) with these difficulties 
at hand, i think that at least, if one argues against Austin that a large 
majority of everday actions are voluntary, one must make it quite clear 
what one is claiming.
17# (2) The second argument against Austin on * inadvertently>
would run something like this:* inadvertent* is restricted to untoward
(or at least, supposedly untoward) actions just, as Aristotle saw,
'snub* is restricted to noses, it is just part of the use of the word
that it is restricted to untoward actions (I don't think much hinges
on whether we say 'use' or 'meaning' here: nor will an appeal to the
dictionary help since dictionaries are extremely generous in the information
they provide). The argument cannot claim that 'he did it inadvertently’
0
means 'he did an untoward thing X-ly' because then it would #e the case
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the case that 'he did an untoward thing inadvertently' would mean 
'he did an untoward, untoward thing Xly’ wliich won't do. if it is 
claimed that snubness is about a concavity peculiar to noses then the 
point can be made using fetlock (why only of a horse?) or gaggle (why 
only of geese?) etc.
Against this argument one wants to ask why this is the case.
Just why is there an adjective to qualify untoward actions? ünd it 
may be that at this stage, an answer of the 'no modification without 
aberration* form will have to be given to explain the existence of 
'inadvertently' (no similar argument will explain 'snub', but luckily 
this is beyond my brief). jpurthermore an argument of the form : we 
don't say of everyday actions that they are 'voluntary, intentional,
47
etc. because it w^ould be pointless , makes unnecessary an argument of 
the form: we only say 'so and so' of so and soes (a restricted use 
argument). The first-type artournent claims we could say of everyday 
actions that they are 'voluntary' etc, but that there is no point in 
so doing, the second claims we can't say of everyday actions 'voluntary'
'inadvertent' because their use is restricted to untoward actions (just 
as it is argueu that we cannot use 'snub* of concave mirrors.)
18. Having tried to prove that the *no modification without
aberration* argument has been applied in three types of case which must
%
be distinguished and that^this has led to confusions, I now want to show 
47 Searle, 'British Analytical Philosophy' pp 41-65
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at least part of what lies behind the argument ('no modification without 
aberration'). I will first quote from Austin's and Cavell's papers.
"The natural economy of language dictates that, for the £tandard_ 
case covered by any normal vern, no modifying expression is re£u^r^d_ 
or even p ermissible. I sit in my chair: here i.t_jtfin no^ that
I sit in it intentionally or that 1 do not sit in it intentionally .....
It is bedtime, i am alone, I yawn, but I do_no_t__ yawn involuntarily, (or 
voluntarily)* or (voluntarily!) ..." "You can ask 'Was ypur action
voluntary' and say to yourself 'All I mean to ask is whether he had a
sensation of effort just before he moved', but^hat will not be finding
out whether the action was voluntary".....  *^ou (must) mean (imply),
in speaking English, that scwiething about an action is fishy when you 
say 'The action is voluntary'•
"This is another instance of the principle that actions which are normal 
will not tolerate any special description.
"But you will never find out what voluntary action is if you 
fail to see when we should say of an action that it is voluntary ...
One may feel the need to say 'Some actions are voluntary and some are 
involuntary. It would be convenient (for what?) to call actions 
voluntary which are not involuntary. Surely I can call them anything 
I like? Surely what I call them doesn't affect what they are?^ Now,
how will you tell me what'they* are?"
* Austin has deafly cheated here, since as we discussed above this 
problem is due to the very tricky kind of thing a yawn is (Austin may 
well answer that th#t waw just what he was on about: still, he could 
have been more explicit.)
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J'erhaps another occurrence of this line of argument is to be 
found in the investigations (para 623): '"At all costs I will get 
to that house." But if there is no difficulty about it - can i try 
at all costs to get to the house?'
These quotes with their use of 'required or even permissible',
'will not do to say', 'will not tèlerate' show the ambiguity of what 
is being argued, it makes all the difference in the world whether 
something is not required or not permissible; what type of an offence 
is made by someone who says it 'won't do to say', 'what won't be tolerated'? 
(it won't do to light your cigar before the toast: it's bad form: are
utterances that'won't do' ungrammatical or 'not true'or 'false' or just 
'bad form'?) Now clearly Cavell cannot be arguing that for an action 
to be voluntary it must be called so (the oddness of his remark 'surely 
what i call them doesn't affect what they are ?' Now, how will you 
tell me what 'they' are?'). what he is arguing is that you only have 
the right to raise the question of 'voluntar}' or 'involuntary' if there 
is at least a suspicion of untowardness. But now one wants to know more 
about untowardness; this cannot simply be a question about an action 
being muffed (failing to come off) since this interpretation would make 
it impossible to ask 'was X voluntary'?, since you would have to know 
whether it was muffed or not to be entitled to raise the question (this 
can't be the case). So untowardness
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must be at least partially analysed in terms of socially (morally) 
undesirable; 1 am entitled to ask 'was it voluntary?* when something 
morally undesirable has occurred. The reason why, as Austin noticed, 
murder cannot be dealt with by his 'no modification principle' is 
because murder has voluntariness built into it. An involuntary murder 
is a manslaughter, it is thus possible to interpret the Austin/Cave11 
doctrine in two ways(l) in a weak way in which 'won't do', 'inappropriate' 
are cashed in for 'pointless' (it is 'pointless' to say that which is 
'inappropriate'). Under this interpretaion their doctrine is open to 
Searle's objections: it is also open to the objection that it fails
to distinguish between the two types of inappropriateness discussed 
below. (2) in a strong way which interprets 'won't do etc. to mean 
'not true* (* false* may well be too strong if one accepts that a 
statement can have an indeterminate truth-value), so to say what is 
'inappropriate* is to say what is * not true'. Under this interprettion 
Searle's objections fall wide of the mark and the two types of inappro- 
priateness are distinguished. I will try to show that Austin/Cavell 
should be saying that if you say something that it 'won't do to say*, 
you are saying something not true since a weaker interpretaion would 
make their thesis uninteresting ; if i am right the form of argument 
to be found in these quotes is something like: "if it is inappropriate 
to attribute quality X to a Y at time T, then Y does not have X at T.
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Is this argument valid?
19# Take the following cases, (l) He and she have been
having difficult times of late. He feels he still lèves her, but 
realizes that he can't say j^jlove you' because she might take this 
to imply that he didn't love her before or loved her less (she might 
think his pronouncement of love was an indication of the waning of the 
feeling, on the grounds thf t saying and doing are incompatible; suffice 
it to say that the interpretations an over-sensitive person could 
give to the coming out with the expression are innumerable).
(2) 1 promise to come to tea at 4 tomorrow. Neither '1 intend to 
keep my promise* nor *I intend to come' are usually appropriate.
(3) After most utterances (except those that might be ironic) 
mean what I sqy* is inappropriate.
(4) It may well be inappropriate to compliment the duchess' cuisine 
with 'damn fine nosh, luv'.
(5) When I shall do something it may be inappropriate to say I may 
do P* rather than *I shall do P*. (Perhaps 'I know' and 'I believe’ 
might be a similar example)
(6) Sometimes when 1 know that P, it is inappropriate to come out 
with 'I know P* instead of 'P'.
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Before I discuss the difference between (l) - (6), 1 womb to 
suggest that they all have in common the following; there are situations 
where to say something would be inappropriate but where, nevertheless, 
what I said which caused the inappropriateness would not be false.
Looking at the cases of inappropriateness may help one to see just what 
Austin-Cavell are claiming.
(4) is straightfowardly ^ojcially inappropriate. In certain 
circles, certain words, accents, grammatical constructions are taboo; 
to use them is soc ially inappropriate. This is a case where it is the 
words ivhich are inappropriate, but there may be cases when it is the 
jcont^nt of what i say which causes the trouble; as when I, as 
best remmind the familial gathering of the delightful week-ends
i used to spend with the bride (this like (4) and (l) is a case of 
tactlessness, which shows that the distinction is not that violent).
(1) Here the inappropriateness (which springs from the 
implications to which the utterance of the words 'I love you* gives 
rise) lies not so much in the nature of the utterance but in its 
timing.* That this is so can be seen from the following reasons:
(i) 1 can attempt to ’cancel' the implication by saying *I loved
you now as 1 loved you before*.
(ii) the same words said in a different situation (when the love was 
new) would not have the implication they have here (which is the case 
in Grice's example of saying of a pupil after a philosophy collection
’Jones has beautiful handwriting’);^ The utterance of the sentence
6:
* For this and other distinctions in this field see H.r. Grice 'The 
causal j^Ltieory of Perception', pp 126-132 PA85V XXXV (I96I)
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does not ^tanda^djj'jinvolve the implication here attributed to it;
it requires a special context to attach the implication to its 
49utterance.’
(iii; ±n a similar situation the same implication could be attributed
to my not coming out with a given utterance (where remarks like
'Hamlet’s not wishing Claudius a good morning show that not all is in
order in the land of Denmark' are /##OL_e).
20. (5) and (6) are examples of the Gricean principle 'une should
not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there
50
is a good reason for so doing.' Since "I shall" is stronger than 
"I may" (the latter is entailed by the former), when i say "*.1 may do 
P", 1 imply that there are reasons for not saying shallH, which
is misleading when l shall do P. And of course that \vhich implies 
something \diich is not the case is linguistically inappropriate.
That this is so may be made to follow from an argument which asserts 
that the aim of assertoric linguistic communication is to inform; 
assertoric linguistic communication which violates this aim is 
in some way tarnished, inappropriate. (This is of course all much 
too sketchy but it is true that a language could not exist where every 
utterance was a lie.) (6) differs from(5), however, since it is not
49 Grice op. cit. p.130
50 Grice op.cit. p. 132
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obvious that ’P' is stronger than 'I know that P*. (P certainly does 
not entail *1 know that P!’j Now there does seem to be a case for 
saying that *P* is stronger than *I know that P'. 1 think that another 
linguistic principle will have to be appealed to ^or invented^ here: 
the principle of economy of effort: if a part of an utterance is idle,
then the use of the idle p«rt is inappropriate, in order to back up 
the(intuitive) hunch that *P* is stronger thah *I know that P* (isn't 
in a similar way *p is true’ stronger than ’P must be true*) one could 
begin to look at contexts where ’I know that P* is used.
{1) it can be used in cases \diere what is in doubt is that the 
speaker knows ;'i know that John is hiding in the closet ^although you 
don't think Î do’).
ill) in cases where ’I just know’ is the sense e.g. ’I know 
he’ll bring back the fireman' (i feel it in my bones)
llll; less happily when a question has been asked: ’who knows 
X is in the park? ’ - ’I know he’s in the park ( but this is odd since 
la) it is a case of knowing whether ib; there is no doubt in the 
questioner’s mind as to X ’s whereabouts (the question implies X is in 
the park) ] what the question seeks to find out ia who knows).
what these,examples might tentatively show is that that which 
makes ’p’ stronger than ‘I know that P’ is the fact that ‘I know that P ’ 
is only uttered in circumstances of uncertainty, when a question has
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to be answered etc.: in these circumstances p tends to be a disputable
item •
All this is much too hit-and-miss to be of much help, but 
perhaps a combination of ‘economy of effort* and ’make the strongest 
assertinhavailable' will help explain d^iy certain phrases like {3)
* 1 mean what i say’ imply * I might not have meant what i said*, isy 
economy of effort, *i mean what 1 say' is idle if used at its face-value, 
therefore when it is used,iLthe presumption is ttiat it is being used 
for a purpose ithat purpose being to imply that the contrary could 
have been the case).
The principles will help us to see the oddness of "I promise . 
to come at 4 tomorrow and 1 intend to come”, for ”I promise” implies 
”I intend” and hence ”I intend” is idle. I used to think that the 
principles might help to to explain the oddness of ”I have decided 
to come at 4 tomorrow and I predict tliat I will come at 4 tomorrow", 
on the grounds that saying "I decide” makes ”I predict” idle, this 
being supported by the strangeness of very precise predictions: (whereas 
”I have decided to be in London on the 25th March 1968" is all right,
"I predict 1*11 be in London on the 25th March I968” is definitely odd), 
but I am now less enthusiastic about this argument.
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The principle of economy of effort can be applied to utterances
as well as to parts of utterances, the point being that an utterance
which serves no purpose in a discourse is inappropriate. Sinee Searle
51uses this argument extensively against Austin-Cave11 , i will first 
state what I take to be their position.
21. When Austin-Cavell claim that it is inappropriate to
modify a description of an action which is not in some way untoivard 
they are not (i) claiming that the inappropriateness is social nor
(ii) that it is inappropriate because tactless, nor are they claiming
(iii) that you can only so qualify untoward actions because it is 
redundant to qualify above-board ones (this is the argument used against 
them in ihejcase of ’voluntary*). However there is little doubt that 
the linguistic oddity of * I brushed my teeth voluntarily this morning* 
is idle here, which makes it the case that its use implies that the 
occasion was somehow out of the ordinar}% It is also the case that
* I brushed my teeth* is a stronger claim than * I brushed my teeth 
voluntarily*. If this is so then what remains to be seen is whether 
Austin-Ca'gell have an argument which does not depend on considering 
certain utterances linguistically inappropriate( since we have seen 
that this may be due to other factors such as the existence of the 
two principles).
51 British Analytic Philosophy op. cit
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This means that only the strong interprétation of their position
can be correct, since the weak one takes their thesis to be founded
‘upon linguistic inappropriateness which we hhve seen will not suffice
to establish that that which is * inappropriate^^is * not true’,(only
^pointless* or ’misleading’), it must be remembered that Austin is
concerned here with excuses for actions : excuses as used to diminish
responsibility. He is talking about aberrant situations (when an
action goes wrong), not about aberrant actions as Searle seems to 
52interpret him: "Or again consider the sentence ’He tied his shoes
on purpose’. It is not easy to imagine a situation where this would 
be in order. But fry ’He stepped on the dog on purpose’. Here it is 
easy to imagine a situation where this would be appropriate, and the 
reason seems to be that stepping on dogs is aberrant in seme way that 
tying shoes is not’. It is not part of Austin’s doctrine that rare 
actions can be modified,("did the scientist extrapolate voluntarily?") 
is just as strange) any more than common ones; rather it is that 
modification can only take place when something has gone wrong, when 
someone is accused, when the question of responsibility is raised.
(It may weel be that an Austin living in vendetta-full 18th-Century 
Sicily would have considered "He murdered his mother’s murderer 
voluntarily" odd.) So it is not a question of the type of action whici^
52 Searle op. cit p .43
- 79 -
will ch matters, but what hinges (legally, morally?) on the given 
performance of an individual action. But this is too strong a claim 
since it assumes that there is no connection between the attribution 
of responsibility and the action being an aberrant one: there is.
whenever a criminal action is detected the question of agent-responsibility 
is raised; only in some casesfiof ordinary everyday actions is the question 
raised (when something unforeseen has happened: when in reaching for
the milk 1 knock over the jam). So Austin cannot be dealing with 
aberrant actions since they are always open to modification: as Austin
admits with reference to murder. It is worth noting that 1 can only 
do action^* inadvertently if 1 am at the same time doing something 
else (y ). it is not surprising that I don't usually notice what I 
am not meaning to do unless s^metiling unpleasant happens. But if 
reaching for the milk he touches her hand and she says overjoyed 
"You touched my hand, you wicked thing" it seems to me he can perhaps 
reply "I did it inadvertently", though this may do little to further 
his amorous intentions.
23* Put crudely, it seems to be the case that Austin/Cavell
are trying to show by app€L_al to linguistic inappropriateness the 
correctness of Hart's "defeasibility" analysis of the concepts being
^ I think that X, Y, needn't be two different actions but only two different 
descriptions of the same what? (atftion, event). The solution of this 
problem is of overriding importance. See, for instance, Davidson , Journal 
of Bhil. 1963 for how it affects the argument that reasons for acting 
cannot be causes of action.
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discussed. But the linguistic theory which lies behind such an 
attempt is never made explicit, hart's point^^ is that the 
'positive-looking doctrine "consent must be true, full and free'*' is 
only accurate as a statement of the law if it is treated as a compendioud 
reference to the defences with which claims in contract may be weakened 
or met, whereas it suggests that there are certain psychological elements 
required by the law as necessary conditions of contract and that the" 
defences are merely admitted as negative evidence of these ... But in 
pursuit of the idll-o'-the-wisp of a general formula legal theorists 
have sought to impose a spurious unity upon these heterogeneous defences 
and exceptions, suggesting that they are admitted as merely evidence 
of the absence ... of two elements I"foresight" and "voluntariness") ... 
This is because the logical character of words like "voluntary" is 
anomalous and ill-understood. They are treated in such definitions 
as words having positive force, yet, as can be seen from Aristotle's 
discussion in Book 111 of the Bthics the word “voluntary" in fact serves 
to exclude a heterogeneous range of cases such as physical compulsion, 
coercion by threats, accidents, mistakes etc, and not to designate a 
mental element or state: nor does ^involuntary" signify this mental
element or state". Now it could be argued that granted that there is 
no one common factor in all cases of "he did it voluntarily", invariably
53 "The Ascription of Jttesponsibility and Bights" reprinted by Flew 
in Logic and Language 1
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the point of passing such a judgement is to see the extent of the 
agent's responsibility (full, diminished); and it must be coneeded 
that cases of everyday actions where nothing goes wrong are paradigms 
of the agent being fully responsible. 5o why are Austin/Cavell intent 
on denying it? Jnit this way Austin/Cavell are claiming more than Hart 
for their argument is not only that it is not the case that all cases 
of voluntary action have anything in com on, but also that to raise the 
question of whether an action was voluntary is to suggest that the 
opposite might have been the case.
24. i will now discuss in detail bearle's arguments against
“No modification without aberration**. t>eairle writes “Thus there seems
54to be a serious assymmetry between A-words and their opposites :?or 
negations. That is to justify fully an utterance of an A-word we 
need, first, evidence of an aberration and secondly, evidence for 
the truth of the utterance. But for the opposite or negative we need 
only evidende of the truth of the utterance. This, I should note, is 
my first flat disagreement with Austin. He says that they both require 
an aberration".
Firstly it must be remembered that one of the points which 
interested Austin was just why certain A-words did not have an opposite. 
There are many ways in which we can "muff” what we are doing, it is
54 A—words are what aearle calls those adjectives which Austin was 
concerned v/ith: unfortunately searle has included in this category other 
words which seem to live unhappily with 'inadvertently'etc.
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not surprising that the ways in which we succeed are less numerous.
So an important characteristic of some of Austin* s words (not all 
A-words) are that the^ have no opposite (e.g. inadvertently); if 
they did have one it would te misleading: ("advertently" suggests
that there is something in common^o the ways of doing all acts not 
done inadvertently, which is not the case); Those that seem to have 
an opposite (e.g. "voluntary") are really masquerading.* If I am 
right in thinking that Searle is mistaken, it will he because his 
A-words do not always correspond to the excusing adjectives Austin 
was concerned with. Certaihly the fourth argument Searle uses to 
define his A-words "An aberration or A-condition for a sentence is 
in general a reason for supposing that the assertion made in 
uttering the opposite or negation of that sentence is or might have 
been true" indicates that this may well be the case.
I want not only to claim that Searle*s argument gains plausi­
bility by treating alike (under the heading A-words) Austin's examples 
and those of other philosophers, but also that the latter should not 
be treated in the manner he(Searle) would like. One of the examples 
Searle uses to define A-words is the verb 'know*. "Some of the things 
Wittgenstein said about the verb 'know* suggest a similar view. 
Wittgenstein objects to saying "I know that I am in painA, or "I know 
what I qm thinking” " .... And then Searle goes on to argue that
* In the sense that 'voluntary* has no^opposite
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Wittgenstein cannot be right since "the negations of the statements
(e.go 'I don't know whether 1 am in pe>u.n* ) are not neither true nor
false but in standard conditions simply false. But it seems to me that
the argument in the Investigations goes something like: we are misled
by grammar into thinking that *I know I am In pain' is like ' I know
how far London is from Canterbury'; if we were to look closely we
would see there is no difference between 'I know I am in pain' and
'I am in pain'. So this cannot be a^case of knowledge, and 'I don't
know whether I am in pain" is equally nonsensical* ( underlying this
argument is a view that knowledge cannot be incorrigible and that since
i cannot be mistaken about my own pain we cannot here be dealing with
a case of knowledge - (the oddness of laaowled^n without observation )•
55Wittgenstein wxites : "In what sense are any sensations ^rivate? - Well, 
only I c*a% know whether I am really in pain , another person can only 
surmise it. In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we 
are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are 
we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.- 
Yes, but all the samp not with the certainty with which I know it myself!
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know 
I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain,
55 op. cit. para 246
* There have of course been arguments where 'I don't know that I am in
pain' was considered nonsensical but not 'I know that I am in pain': these 
arguments relied on the fact that my knowledge of my pains was incorrigible, 
but did not object to that which was incorrigible being called knowledge, 
what is particular to Wittgenstein's ar-^ument is the calim that ' I know that 
I am in ppin' and 'I don't know that I am in p^in'are actually nonsensical.
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Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only 
from my behaviour - for I cannot be said to learn of them: I have them.
The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they
doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself." Now if
Wittgenstein is right here (though i am not asserting tiièt he is) then
"I don’t know whether 1 am in pain" is as inappropriate as *1 know
that/whether 1 am in pain." (hence not an A-word): if Wittgenstein is
wrong, if there is nothing inappropriate about ’i know that I am in 
pain* then also it is not an A-word. 1 think it eould be shown that 
all the £b^l£sophi£al_ examples Searle uses id. 11 not fit his description 
of A- words (for instance, presumably what Benjamin is saying in 
"Kememberimg” is that to remember one's name is not a paradigm of 
forgetting) and that you could not teach people how to use * remembering^ 
by asking them to imagine what it would be like to remember their name; 
since it is very difficult to imagine what forgetting one's name would 
be like (as it were, remembering one's name is equivalent to having a 
memory in the sense that if 1 can't remember my name, I can't remember 
anything.) However, Benjamin is not arguing that 'I don't remembe^y 
name' cannot have a use, since it clearly has : (it is often an indication
of a person's having lost his memory^; however there remain his every­
day examples.
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25. Va) The president is sober today
Vb) The m m  at the next table is not lighting his cigarette 
with a 20-dollar bill.
(c) Jones is breathing 
"Now what I am suggesting is that these sentences are like the 
previous examples (the philosophical ones) in that their utterance is 
only appropriate under certain aberrant or fishy conditions". Searle 
in the positive part of his paper suggests that we will find the correct 
explanation of the problem about A-words by "distinguishing the propo­
sition that r and the act which i perform when I assert that P". And 
he further says "So I can only make an assertion if there is some reasoh 
for supposing the state of affairs asserted is worthy of note or in some 
respect remarkable". Thi^is an important point but 1 do not think it 
will differentiate what seem# to me to be two importantfydifferent C&ses :
(l) When what 1 say is true but pointless. For instance, I am 
quietly sitting with you in Hyde Park and i say ’I am sitting with 
you in Hyde Park", or Wien the bowl of soup is brought to the table,
1 say "A bowl of soup" etc. Now in these cases there does not seem 
to be a strong temptation to suppose that the situation was (could 
have been) in anyway aberrant, that it might not have been a bowl of 
soup. Of course someone who continually utters obviously true state­
ments may be lacking in intellectual powers, but what kind of mistake 
(linguistic) would bearle take him to be making?
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1 am quite sure that there are many heads of family who say ’a nice 
howl of soup' t'wlce a day with diurnal regularity without in any way 
wanting to suggest Vor suggesting) that anything is amiss (and it 
doesn't explain much to say that this is a ritualistic use of language).
V (2) Where Wiat i say is JltrueV" but misleading in that it
suggests that something else might have been the case e.g. “1 came 
into this room of my oim free will". Almost certainly Austin/Cavell 
would make a difference between (1) and(2) and claim that examples 
of (2) were not only pointless but also inappropriate (with which 
they should be taken to imply 'not true'). Remembering our two 
linguistic principles we can see that the principle of 'economy of 
effort* will rather explain the peculiarity of type(l) situations, whereas 
the 'always make the strongest claim" principle is better fitted to 
explain the inappropriateness of type (2) atuations V^ut this is only 
at best sometimes the case since there is no obvious reason to suppose 
that 'I came here* is stronger than 'I came here voluntarily'), it 
may be the case that what Austin should have discussed is why in 
certain situations (type 2), saying what seem# to be true statements 
has implications which are not present in type 1 atuations and then if 
he were able to uncover a general linguistic principle, have proceeded 
to explain why 'excuses' for actions belonged to type 2, but in any 
case it does seem to be true that any repudiation of the Austin/Cavell
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thesis ^dll have to recognize a difference between type 1 and 2 
situations which Searle’s does not.
26. The mistake that Searle^^ accuses Austin/Cavell of having
made is of attributing to certain words qualities which whould be
57attributed to the speech-acts the words occur in: "Austin ’s point,
then, is not properly speaking about words or even sentences, it is 
a point about what it is to make an assertion. To make an assertion is 
to commit oneself to something’s being the case as opposed to things 
not being the case. But if the possibility of its not being the 
case is not even under consideration, or if its being the case is one 
of the assumptions of the discourse, then the remark that it is the 
case is just pointless!!. And*Austin has made this mistake through 
failing to distinguish between propositions which form as it were the 
contents of assertions (and other speech-acts) and the speech-acts 
themselves, i distinguish between the propositions that P and the acts 
which 1 perform when i assert that P. That there is a distinction is 
shown by the fact that the same proposition can be a common content of 
such different speech-acts as questioning idiether p, commanding thatp, 
wqrning that p, ex-œssing doubts as to whether p, etc. as well as asserting 
that p/ rinally searle c l a i m s t h a t  Austin has fallen into error
56 see also his ^Meaning and speech-acts". Here other offenders are 
on trial.
57 op.cit. p.48
58 searle op.cit. p. 54
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through using a "the meaning is the use" argument and thus making 
the general methodological error of supposing that the conditions 
in which it is correct to assert that p are identical with the conditions 
in which it is the case that p. **But there is no reason at all to 
suppose that these are identical, since assertion in only one kind 
of speech-act among many, with its own special conditions of performance". 
JL will make two points which may show Searle's argument to be not that 
damaging for Austin.
Vl) it may be useful I hope not unduly perverse) to
remember that when the'meaning is use' standard was raised it claimed 
' for a large class of cases - thou;_,h not for all - in which we ^mp^lpy 
the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a ward is
its use in the language*. Now at least a possible interpretation of
the claiÿ is that the best way to show (to teach ) a person the
meaning of a word is to look at its use. suppose I want to teach 
someone the meaning of * red*: i begin by ointing to red objects and
saying "That is red" etc.; in speechr-act language I perform a speech-
act of assertion. I could not hope to teach anybody much by a series
of questions^ (is this red?;, orders ('fetch me a red object'), warnings 
('Beware the red light district') etc. 80 we have a sense in which asser­
tions have primary place in the teaciiing of meaning. At best we have 
shown that assertions have primacy in teaching the meaning of a word.
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not in determining*^ uhe meaning of a word: still the meaning of a word 
must reside in its possibilities of combination with other words vit 
is part of the meaning of ‘red' that i can say 'red friut' but not 
'red calculation') and of course, the more specific a combination, 
the more informativ^e it is about meaning v^hat i can qualify 'boy' 
with 'rough' tells me more about 'boy' than the fact that 1 can
qualify 'boy' with 'good', since there are fewer things i can qualify 
with 'rough' than with 'good'). i think the same point could he made 
about the r(Je of speech-acts in determining meaning: it tells me nothing
about the meaning of a word that it can appear in the speech-act of
questioning, since all words can, but it Adoes tell me something about 
the word ’voluntary' that it can only be used in a speech-adt Vthat is of 
assertion; that suggests that the opposite to what is asserted might 
have been the case, v^f course part of the difficulty in arguing against
oearle is that one is not sure just what kind of speech-acts can exist
Vare they all and only all those acts for which there is a first-person 
performative?^ ) Taking Searle*s point in 'Meaning and Speech-Acts* that 
good is only commendatory when it occurs in speech-afts of commendation, 
but not in Speech-acts of questioning, I would want to argue that the 
fact that a word can occur in and contribute^to the effect of a speech- act
^ Such vague language is reo^uired by my ignorance as to the relationship 
between Vi) meanings of words and (ii) effects of speech-acts.
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of commendation (not all words do) tells us more about its meaning 
than that it can appear in speech-acts of questioning, asserting,
(all words can) and it seems likely that an opponent of Searle would 
make much out of the fact tthat only certain words can occur in more 
than a role of 'extra' in speech-acts of commendation. It seems very 
plausible to suggest that this possibility must be made to derive from 
their meaning. So now even if e accept that a word cannot have 
commendatory meaning we want to claim that it is because of a word's 
meaning that it can (or cannot) occur in speech-act# of commendation.
(2) Whatever may be the force of tiiese arguments there is another point 
a supporter of Austin could make: roughly, Searle'z argument against
Hare's claim that 'good' has commendatory meaning was as follows:
(i) It is assumed that in all its occurrences 'good' has the 
same meaning.
(ii) when 'good' occurs in speech-acts of ccamnendation, it 
has commendatory meaning.
(iii) But when 'good' occurs in other speech-acts (of questioning) 
it is not any longer the case that there is a speech-act of commendation, 
not even 'in the offing'.
Therefore (iv) it is concluded that on those ocdasions when 'good' has 
commendatoiy meaning (all indicative sentences) this is due to the fact 
that a speech-act of commendation has taken place and is not due to the
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meaning of 'good'. An important claim of the argument is that 
when 'good' occurs in other speech-acts there is not even a speech- 
act of commendation ' im  the offing' (e.g. 'If this is a good electric 
blanket' cannot mean 'if I commend this blanket'), but take an^ 
apparently similar argument: (l) Let us assume the meaning of 'i warn 
him' constant (11) in indicative present uses of 'I warn'him' the speaker 
warns (111) but in 'should 1 warn him?' the speaker doesn't warn.
Therefore (IV) the fact that the speaker warns in present indicative 
uses derives not from the meaning of 'I warn'but from the fact that a 
speech-act of warning is being undertaken: which clearly is anjlnsufficient
argument since one wants to know why 'I warn* can occur in speech-acts 
of warning (which is not given to all verks). Still this argument 
differs from Searle's 'argument about good, since when"I warn" occurs 
in "Should 1 warn him" it does seem to be the case that a speech-act 
of warning is in the offing, and importantly 1 think that this difference 
is also to be found in Searle's argument against Austin on "voluntaryA 
which is as follows:
(I) let us assume the meaning of 'voluntary' constant in all its
uses
(II) when 'voluntary' is used in a speech-act of assertion it 
implies that the action has in some way been 'muffed' (this because the 
pointfulness argument suggests the opposite ^ould have been the case)
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but (111) it does not perform this function v/hen it appears in other 
speech-acts.
Therefore (IV) this function derives from the way assertions work, 
not from the qieaning of * voluntary ' . But is (111) right here? If 
Austin is correct in claiming that 'inadvertently' can only be used 
if untowardness has occurred, will he not also want to argue that the 
same must be true for its use in questions, in orders, in conditionals.
And I certainly cannot see any difference in implication between 'he 
did it inadvertently' and 'Did he do it inadvertently?' (It would 
make no difference to rephrase Austin's argument as follows: "I sit
in my chair in the usual vay ... it will not do to ask whether I sat 
in it intentionally, not yet whether I sat in it from habit or 
automatically or what you will ...." (of course there is the problem 
about asking that which 1 am supposed to know about in order to be 
"entitled" to ask. (see above) Still, the point is valid, Austin 
would not have claimed a different implication for  ^if he di d X 
voluntarily, then ....") It is also the case that if Wittgenstein 
is right in saying that "I know I am in pain" is nonsensical (in his
sense of the word), then "Do you know whether you are in pain?" and 
know whether you are 
AI order you to /\ in pain" are equally nonsensical. So it does not
seem that the peculiarity of Austin's adjectibes come from the properties
the speech-act of assertion possesses, since they occur in other speech-acts.
-  193 -
It is of course open to Searle to argue that all this shows is that 
certain speech-acts have certain properties in common (namely, that 
questions, orders, assertions etc. have the common property of making 
some adjectives carry with their use certain implications) hut this 
could only be done at great cost to his argument (”I distinguish 
between the propositions that p and the acts which I perform when 
I assert that p. That there is a distinction is shown by the fact 
that the same proposition can be a common content of such speech-acts 
as questioning whether p, commanding that p, warning that p, expressing 
doubt as to whether p, as well as asserting that p). However it is 
not the case that this move can be made against Searle's argument 
about the meaning of "good", because speech-acts of commendation are on 
a different level from speech-acts of assertion . This is because I 
perform a speech-act of commendation whilst I perform a speech-act 
of assertion (we are back to what bothered Austin: that v^hen I warn,
i also make aljptatement). Searle has not taken this into consideration 
but having done so, he could then argue that whereas in indicative uses 
of ' good' I make al^ommendation at the same time as making an assertion, 
this is not the case in interrogative uses (I make no commendation).
He could then go on to claim that this was not to do with the meaning 
of good' but it was because of the characteristics of assertions which 
allowed commendations to be performed^inultaneously , whereas questions
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do not. it does seem , however, that any analysis of meaning in 
terms of speech-acts ill have to resort to speech-acts of warning, 
ordering, promising etc, rather than speech-acts of questioning, 
asserting etc. At the very least, the exact nature of our inquiry 
will determine what class of speech-acts we investigate: if we want
to el«icit the meaning of a particular word ('good') we must list 
those speech-acts it alone ap lears in; if we want to elicit a th^-eory 
about language (A-words) we will have to examine speech-acts of a less 
specific kind: this is seen by the fact that it would be of little
use to examine, in search of the meaning of good*, speech-acts of 
assertion, qua assertions, alone.
28. if anything at all has emerged from this section it is the
negative-looking point that there dannot be any one theory which will 
explain the importantly dissimilar examples Austin used. A^heory which 
tries to explain the inappropriateness of 'voluntary* when applied to 
ordinary, everyday actions will not explain why there is no such word 
as ^inadvertently”: on the other hand a theory which explains the use 
of 'involuntary* on grounds of utility (what it is for an action to go 
wrong, Avhy we are more concerned with actions going wrong than with 
actions going right etc.) seems to be unable to account for the fact 
that ordinary, everyday actions are performed voluntarily. 'Intentionally*
is different again: a beginning in showing the difference would be
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to see what type of inquiry an analysis of 'intentionally^ will be.
And there does seem to be a difference here: since clearly an analysis
of 'voluntarily' will have to take into consideration what ‘voluntarily' 
is used for ; since it is used to attribute responsibility, one would 
have to see why it is sometimes important to attribute responsibility 
(its connection wdth being 'blameworthy' etc.) but an analysis of 
'intentionally' starts with no need to disentangle such a **»crossing 
of concepts, since we do not have any preconceived ideas about what 
particular sub-class of actions(events?; intentional actions will be,
AS Anscombe says 'when we are tempted to speak of 'different senses' 
of a word which is clearly not equivocal, we am) infer that we are in 
fact pretty much in the dark about the character of the concepts which 
it represents’. It is for this reason that the 'implication of unto­
wardness' is much less strong blth ' intentionedly' than with ’voluntary', 
for when 1 say ’he did it intentionally' it is difficult to see just 
what is claimed to be amiss (perhaps it is the case that 'intentionally' 
lacks a strong implication of untowardness because it is a technical 
(philosophically technical ) word: but # one has no criteria for
technicality). It may be that the strength of a word's implication 
depends not on how many people know and use it, but rather on how deeply 
it is embedded in the way we look at things, but this is no more than 
a wild guess»
